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1. Introduction
The McKell Institute is an independent,  
not-for-profit, public policy institute dedicated to 
developing practical policy ideas and contributing 
to public debate. The McKell Institute takes its 
name from New South Wales’ wartime Premier and 
Governor–General of Australia, William McKell.
William McKell made a powerful contribution to both New South Wales and Australian 
society through significant social, economic and environmental reforms
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Infrastructure expenditure is already failing to keep 
up with community infrastructure, and population 
growth is driving demand for new services. 
Meanwhile, state governments are increasingly 
restricted by the need to ensure that their credit 
ratings remain strong.
This challenge will only grow as Australia’s 
demographics continue to shift. By 2050, the ratio 
of workers to non-workers will decline from 5-to-
1 today to 2.4-to-1. Whilst the biggest impact of 
this demographic shift will be felt by the federal 
government through reduced income tax revenue, 
state governments will also be impacted through a 
proportional decline in payroll tax receipts. 
The impact of this decline should not be 
underestimated. Payroll tax currently comprises 
30% of total state government revenue and is 
expected to raise $34.3 billion for the New South 
Wales (NSW) Government over the forward 
estimates. Were the ratio of workers to non-
workers the same today as is forecast to be the 
case for 2050, all other things being equal or held 
constant, payroll tax receipts would be almost $18 
billion lower. 
As government continues to balance growing costs 
and proportionally declining revenue, competition for 
scare budget dollars will increase and infrastructure 
investments will be increasingly judged on their long-
term financial cost to government. 
This will prove particularly challenging for transport 
infrastructure projects that are unable to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover recurrent operational costs, 
let alone repay the up-front costs of construction.
Many transport assets fall into this category. 
Whilst investments in water or energy assets can 
generally be recouped through higher user charges, 
differences in demand elasticity means that 
investments in transport assets are rarely able to be 
recouped in the same manner. 
To ensure that vital new transport infrastructure 
is not left off the table in future government 
budgets, this report has examined a number 
of options available for boosting the revenue 
streams associated with currently cost-inhibitive 
infrastructure classes. 
By utilising innovative new funding models including 
tax-increment financing, joint project development, 
increased user charges and other value capture 
schemes, the long-term cost to government 
budgets from new transport investments can be 
substantially reduced. These recommendations will 
help ensure that new transport infrastructure can 
be developed to meet the future needs of NSW’s 
growing community. 
NSW also needs new a new governance 
framework to restore confidence in our state’s 
infrastructure strategy. 
In addition, a new narrative will be required to 
engage the community in a realistic discussion 
about the long term challenges facing infrastructure 
delivery in NSW.
This report hopes to be the beginning of that 
conversation.
One of the key challenges facing policymakers is the question of how to fund 
new transport infrastructure in an increasingly fiscally restrained environment. 
The Hon John Watkins
CHAIR,  
MCKELL INSTITUTE 
Sam Crosby
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
MCKELL INSTITUTE
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Executive Summary
Political commentators complain that our cities 
are suffering from a “lost decade” of infrastructure 
underinvestment. In addition, there is now a widely 
held perception that what little infrastructure has 
been built, has been poorly designed and poorly 
delivered. 
In short, the community has lost faith in our 
Government’s ability to deliver the infrastructure 
assets and associated services required by a 
growing society. 
There is no shortage of differing perspectives on 
how this infrastructure shortfall should be addressed. 
Some commentators have argued that we should 
simply borrow more and treat any additional 
expenditure as an investment rather than an 
additional cost on the government’s budget balance 
sheet. Others have suggested that we should 
raise taxes or design new ones in order to fund the 
infrastructure needs of tomorrow. An alternative 
approach involves the privatisation of state owned 
assets in order to “recycle” their capital value into the 
development of new transport assets. 
Various industry sectors have proposed 
alternative solutions, ranging from a greater 
use of superannuation funds in the financing 
of new projects, reforms to the existing Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) structures to enhance 
competition during tendering, alternative risk-
sharing arrangements, and the converting of 
infrastructure bonds. 
This report seeks to examine the infrastructure 
shortfall through a different lens, by examining 
its root causes in order to determine a series of 
recommendations on the future funding of transport 
infrastructure. 
The report examines the data over the past twenty 
years and determines that there has not been an 
overall decline in expenditure on infrastructure. 
Indeed for most years (except the last two) 
spending on infrastructure has been consistently 
growing, both in real terms and as a proportion of 
public expenditure. 
Instead, this report notes that it is the type of 
infrastructure which is funded that has changed. 
While there has been an overall increase in capital 
expenditure, it is increasingly invested in areas 
that are less immediately obvious to the public. 
Government Trading Enterprises (GTEs) such 
as Sydney Water and the electricity networks 
have expanded their services and improved their 
networks considerably. 
At the same time, the proportion of investment 
in other classes of infrastructure has not been 
maintained. This is particularly true for many forms 
of transport infrastructure. In that sense, the 
public perception of today’s “infrastructure crisis” 
is actually a reflection of the reality that a growing 
proportion of infrastructure investment is delivered 
into areas that are less immediately obvious to the 
daily lives of NSW residents. 
Most people in NSW generally accept the common assertion that we are 
experiencing an infrastructure crisis. It is often argued that recent years  
have seen a chronic underspend by state and federal governments  
on vital community infrastructure. 
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This report then examines why some infrastructure 
classes have received a growing proportion of public 
expenditure and why others have languished. 
Successive governments have allocated a greater 
proportion of infrastructure expenditure to those 
service providers that can make a return on their 
investment while also repaying their initial upfront 
capital. 
Logically, it makes sense to finance a new 
desalination plant for Sydney, which once built, 
can either be privatised at a profit to taxpayers, or 
provide a healthy revenue stream for government. 
It makes sense, at least financially, even if we 
don’t immediately need a desalination plant. It also 
makes sense to expand and improve the electricity 
network, given its status as a profitable entity that 
can easily repay the cost of capital expenditure 
while also providing an expanding dividend stream 
to the NSW Treasury. 
Conversely, governments have been less willing 
to expand infrastructure that does not make a 
financial return, particularly if that infrastructure 
requires a recurrent subsidy to meet its ongoing 
operational costs. 
This report seeks to define the major infrastructure 
programmes into three broad categories based 
on their capacity to make a financial return and 
whether or not they require recurrent financial 
support from Treasury. 
 Category A infrastructure investments are those 
that can fully repay the cost of capital and 
subsequently provide a recurrent profit on their 
initial investment. 
 Category B are those which cannot repay the 
cost of capital but do generate enough revenue 
to cover their recurrent operational costs. 
 Category C are those which cannot repay 
the cost of capital and which also require 
an ongoing subsidy from Treasury to meet 
recurrent operational costs. It is this category 
that has seen a decline in the proportion of total 
capital expenditure over the past two decades.
Critically, Category C infrastructure assets tend to be 
those types of infrastructure which are most visible 
to the public eye, most notably our roads and trains. 
It is the shortage of expenditure in these areas which 
is creating the broader community perception of a 
growing infrastructure deficit.
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This report also examines some of the 
solutions put forward to help address the 
infrastructure shortfall, including the greater 
use of superannuation funds to finance new 
infrastructure, the issuing of infrastructure bonds, 
an increase in government borrowing, the raising 
of new taxes, user charges, and the privatisation 
of existing state-owned assets. 
For each of these proposals, the authors seek 
to make no political judgement on their validity. 
There is a case that can be made for each of these 
proposals under the right circumstances. However, 
this report also notes that many of these proposals 
fail to specifically address the issue of securing 
appropriate funding for Category C infrastructure, 
that is, the requirement for government to provide 
a recurrent subsidy in order to adequately cover 
basic operational costs.
It is fiscally imprudent to borrow in perpetuity to 
fund recurrent expenditure. It makes less sense to 
privatise profitable enterprises in order to fund non 
profitable services. That is the road to a Greece 
style collapse of public coffers.
This report contends that Category C infrastructure 
will continue to receive a smaller proportion of 
overall infrastructure funding for so long as there 
remains a substantial need for recurrent subsidies. 
If the government and the community wants to see 
more Category C type infrastructure then both will 
have to face some difficult choices.
The solution resides in changing the financial 
and funding arrangements supporting these 
investments so as to move Category C 
infrastructure over into the Category A, or at a 
minimum, Category B. 
This report examines how other cities have 
managed to achieve this through value capture 
mechanisms, joint property development, tax 
increment financing, hypothecated taxes, tolling, 
and other user charges.
The report also concludes that NSW needs more 
than just a change in how it funds and finances 
new transport infrastructure. It concludes that what 
is needed is a new, long term governance structure 
that will support long term decision making and 
reliable project delivery. 
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Recommendations
RECOMMENDATION 1 
That a transport summit be held in order to 
develop a consensual approach to planning 
and delivering long-term improvements to the 
state’s transport network. 
The summit would include representation from all 
political forces with parliamentary representation 
in NSW and would also include participation from 
transport experts, key public servants, industry 
stakeholders and community leaders. 
The format for the transport summit should be 
partially modelled on the highly successful 1999 
NSW Drug Summit.
RECOMMENDATION 2 
That the NSW Government trial a pilot value 
capture scheme to secure additional revenue 
streams that can support the funding of new 
transport projects.
The ideal method for capturing land value increases 
that result from the delivery of new transport 
infrastructure would be to introduce a levy similar 
to the Business Rates Supplement (BRS) currently 
used by Transport For London. 
Ideally the levy would be set at a low rate with a 
broad base and minimal exceptions. However, 
government may wish to implement a land-value 
threshold below which the levy would not be 
payable so as to exempt small and medium sized 
businesses from any additional impost. Provided a 
similar threshold were made available for residential 
property, a Sydney Rates Supplement could also 
be applied to residential properties within the 
immediately benefitted area.  
Different models should be trialled in different 
regions to determine which overall model would be 
most appropriate for NSW. 
RECOMMENDATION 3
That the NSW Government conduct further 
research into the international experience 
of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) in order to 
determine how government might best be able 
to introduce this model into the Australian 
context. 
Although widely used to finance infrastructure in 
both the UK and USA, this model of financing is 
relatively undeveloped in Australia. Government 
should examine the wide range of existing  
evidence on this topic to see if such models  
can be introduced into the Australian context.
RECOMMENDATION 4 
That the NSW Government direct 
UrbanGrowth to investigate whether Joint 
Property Development (JPD) could be used 
as a means of securing private funding for 
transport infrastructure upgrades across the 
Sydney rail network. That the broader use 
of JPD only be pursued following planning 
reforms that will incentivise more Transit-
Oriented Development.
The NSW Government should examine the funding 
models used by Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Railway 
Corporation (MTRC) in order to determine the most 
appropriate method for attracting private funds into 
the development and redevelopment of rail assets. 
UrbanGrowth should look beyond the 
commendable Central to Eveleigh redevelopment 
project to consider whether similar projects are 
feasible elsewhere on the Sydney rail network.
To secure more favourable revenue streams from 
any future JPD agreements, the NSW Government 
should enact planning reforms that facilitate easier 
access to rezoning and a greater use of “code 
assessable” development in the areas immediately 
surrounding train stations. 
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RECOMMENDATION 5 
That the Commonwealth Government further 
investigate the Productivity Commission’s 
hybrid-financing model – based on Industry 
Super Australia’s Inverted Bid Model – as a 
worthwhile reform to enhance the capacity 
of the superannuation sector to invest in new 
transport infrastructure.
Currently, most superannuation funds and other 
large investors are unwilling to invest in greenfield 
transport projects. Greenfield projects represent 
a higher risk investment than the purchase of an 
existing brownfield transport asset. 
The hybrid-financing model would help make 
greenfield investment risk more manageable 
for potential financiers, potentially increasing 
the number of competing investors tendering 
for greenfield transport projects. The increased 
competition that would arise from this reform is 
likely to deliver more favourable bidding outcomes 
for the Government and taxpayers, including lower 
availability payments or reduced levels of recurrent 
government funding.  
RECOMMENDATION 6 
That the NSW Government consider the 
introduction of a both a Metropolitan 
Transport Levy and a CBD Congestion Tax in 
order to help cover the unfunded recurrent 
cost of expanded transport services.  
Any funding obtained through new levies and 
charges should be entirely hypothecated 
towards improving transport services and strictly 
quarantined from being absorbed into consolidated 
revenue. 
RECOMMENDATION 7
That the NSW Government pursue the greater 
use of user charges on all new major roads 
and rail projects. 
Though scope for increased user charging on rail 
transport remains limited by the high price elasticity 
of rail fares, government should nevertheless 
continue to examine whether additional revenue 
can be raised through marginal changes to some 
fare structures. Government should also embrace 
toll-roads as the new norm for major road projects 
in NSW. Where tolls are applied to road freight, 
there needs to be a clear mechanism in place 
to pass all additional costs on to the primary 
contractor and end user.
To strengthen community support for increased 
user charges, new rules should be introduced 
to ensure that all transport revenue is strictly 
hypothecated towards the funding of transport 
services. 
To ensure taxpayers dollars are allocated efficiently 
and appropriately, improvements will need to be 
made to patronage forecasting and cost-benefit 
analysis processes.
RECOMMENDATION 8
That Government reduce the risk of being 
burdened with poor value infrastructure by 
securing more accurate patronage forecasts 
and by publicly releasing cost-benefit 
analyses for all major transport projects.
The Government should also consider the wider 
use of reference class forecasting to provide a 
second-layer analysis of the likely costs associated 
with new transport projects. 
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RECOMMENDATION 9
That the NSW Government establish a new 
transport delivery agency that is well funded 
and appropriately empowered to further 
enhance Sydney’s transport network. The 
agency should be semi-independent and 
reportable to the Parliament.
The new agency could be modelled on Transport 
for London or the recently reformed UK Highways 
Agency. This could be done either by establishing 
an entirely new agency or through expanding the 
powers of Infrastructure NSW. 
The agency would be responsible for the long 
term planning, prioritisation and delivery of new 
infrastructure. Such an agency should be resourced 
and empowered to make decisions beyond the 
three year budget cycle and beyond the four year 
political cycle.
The agency should be resourced to analyse 
transport proposal presented to it by both 
governing and non-governing political parties. All 
major transport proposals and any proposed long-
term infrastructure strategy devised by the agency 
should be put to the parliament for a non-binding 
symbolic vote. 
A new parliamentary convention should be created 
under which major projects are only advanced 
once they have received majority bipartisan support 
within the parliament. Funding could then be 
appropriated to the new agency to assist with the 
delivery of those projects. 
RECOMMENDATION 10 
That the NSW Government articulate to 
the community the true costs of transport 
services in order to strengthen community 
support for higher user charges. 
The recommendations contained within this report 
are substantially more likely to be accepted by the 
community if it is fully informed about the scope of 
the funding challenge facing transport infrastructure 
in NSW. 
Government should seek to educate the 
community about both the costs and opportunity 
costs associated with investing in different transport 
assets. It should also better articulate the social 
and economic cost of not investing in transport 
infrastructure. 
The benefits of urban consolidation will need to 
be explained to the community. Urban sprawl has 
significant consequences for services delivery, 
the environment, and congestion. A clear public 
case should be made which demonstrates the link 
between higher density and better amenity with a 
particular focus on the capacity to fund new public 
transport projects in higher density areas.
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Despite this, the ageing of our population 
will result in a substantial restructuring of the 
Australian workforce with significant implications 
for government revenue and expenditure. While 
in 1970 there were 7.5 people of working age 
for every person over the age of 65, by 2010 this 
ratio had fallen to 5 to 1. By 2050, this ratio will fall 
further to just 2.4 to 1, leaving the government with 
substantially fewer taxpayers to support a growing 
contingent of retirees with expensive requirements 
in both the health care and aged care sectors.3 
Similar problems exist at the state government 
level. As the scales tilt from a worker dominated 
community to a retiree abundant community, 
revenue from payroll tax will be increasingly 
stretched to accommodate the advanced 
healthcare needs of an older population. 
Payroll tax is NSW’s largest tax and last year 
accounted for 30% of state government revenue. 
Over the forward estimates, the NSW Government 
is expecting to collect $34.3 billion in payroll tax.4 
Were the ratio of workers to non-workers the same 
today as is forecast to be the case for 2050, all 
other things being equal or held constant, payroll 
tax receipts would be almost $18 billion lower. 
While the interaction between an ageing population 
and state payroll tax receipts is somewhat more 
complicated than the above calculation would 
suggest, the broad conclusion is correct. An 
ageing population will leave state budgets with 
less revenue at precisely the same time that state 
governments will need to spend more on the 
advanced health need of our senior Australians. 
From 2009–10 to 2049–50, real health spending 
on those aged over 65 years is expected to 
increase around seven-fold. Over the same period, 
real health spending on those over 85 years is 
expected to increase around twelve-fold.5 The 
number of people with Alzheimer’s alone will grow 
to 900,000.6
In addition to these demographic pressures, 
demand for higher standards of health care will 
also place added pressure on the Government 
to increase health expenditure, as will the costs 
associated with rapid technological innovation. 
As state and federal budgets are increasingly 
stretched by the dichotomy of rising costs and 
proportionally shrinking revenue, other areas 
of government spending will face more fierce 
competition over the allocation of government 
expenditure. Increasingly, governments will be 
required to consider not just the cost, but the 
opportunity cost, of investment in one area versus 
another. Infrastructure projects will need to be 
weighed up carefully to consider whether they 
represent the best possible application of taxpayer 
dollars.
The challenge of shrinking 
revenue and growing costs
Like most countries, Australia is experiencing a period of significant 
economic and social change. Compared to most other developed nations, 
our ratio of debt-to-GDP is quite low,1 and Australia is one of the few 
countries fortunate enough to boast a AAA credit rating from all three major 
credit ratings agencies.2
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FIGURE 1:  
TOTAL AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURE WITH AND WITHOUT  
NON-DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH7
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Population growth, whether natural or through 
immigration, will help to ensure that there are new 
taxpayers coming online as older taxpayers retire. 
Participation rates will influence tax receipts in 
much the same way, while productivity growth will 
influence the wage growth of Australian workers, 
which in turn influences income tax receipts. 
Australia’s population is already expected to grow 
substantially between now and 2040. Forecasts by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) show that 
by 2040, NSW’s population will increase by 35% to 
just under 10 million.9 This population growth will 
be necessary to offset a demographic driven hit 
on state and federal government budgets, though 
this will also have other implications for state and 
federal policy makers. The most obvious of these is 
that there will need to be a substantial increase in 
new transport infrastructure. 
Ensuring that transport infrastructure remains 
both accessible and reliable for NSW residents will 
be critical to ensuring that participation rates are 
boosted to their highest possible levels. 
Targeted investment in infrastructure to remove 
bottlenecks will also be critical to ensuring that Australian 
companies remain competitive, which in turn will help 
achieve that the NSW and Australian economies are 
able to secure strong productivity growth. 
This represents something of a policy dilemma 
for today’s policy makers. While the ageing of our 
population will increasingly undermine government 
revenue, the solution to that problem will invariably 
require an increase in new transport infrastructure. 
It is hard to envisage Australia boosting its three P’s 
without also investing in new roads, new rail, and 
new public transport facilities. 
Despite this, competition for scarce government 
resources will remain fierce, adding impetus to the need 
for policy makers to examine innovative new ways to 
fund and finance the infrastructure of tomorrow.
The three P’s - Population, 
Participation & Productivity
As highlighted in the most recent Intergenerational Report, the extent to 
which Australia’s economy is able to offset the fiscal challenges associated 
with an ageing population will be heavily determined by the evolution of 
our ‘3Ps’ – population, participation, and productivity.8
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This report notes that some of these larger 
estimates precede the substantial transport 
infrastructure investments that occurred as part of 
the federal government’s response to the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
This report accepts that additional investment is 
not always the best solution to an infrastructure 
service shortfall. Evidence suggests that congestion 
charging for roads in peak periods could reduce 
Sydney’s congestion by reducing and better 
distributing demand.13 This would suggest that 
it is sometimes possible to reduce infrastructure 
bottlenecks through a better utilization of existing 
infrastructure.  
Nevertheless, population growth forecasts for 
Australia would indicate that the scale of the 
infrastructure challenge facing our country remains 
immense. Even if the most conservative of these 
forecasts is used, Australia will need to deliver $300 
billion in new infrastructure over the next decade. 
As Australia’s most populous state, much of this 
burden will fall on NSW. 
Excluding pubic trading enterprises, the most 
recent state budget has set aside some $38.3 
billion for infrastructure expenditure over 
the foreword estimates.14 Many of the new 
infrastructure projects announced in the budget 
are still in the early stages, awaiting the outcome 
of planning and feasibility studies. The budget 
allocated money for studies into building the F6 
extension from Loftus to St Peters, the M9 outer 
Sydney orbital road in far Western Sydney, a tunnel 
from the northern beaches, and a Parramatta light 
rail system. 
Whether these projects are delivered remains to 
be seen. The NSW Government has received 
some criticism for spending $700 million on 69 
planning and feasibility studies.15 While it is entirely 
appropriate that proper planning and scoping is 
undertaken before committing to new infrastructure 
outlays, it remains highly unlikely that every single 
project announced in the budget will be delivered. 
NSW has a regrettable history of major projects 
being announced and never delivered, and many 
projects are dropped once it emerges that the 
financial case for an individual project is too weak 
to justify the additional outlay. Tighter fiscal times 
mean that the cost-benefit analysis applied to new 
projects is only likely to become more rigorous. 
Whether or not new projects go ahead will be 
increasingly determined by not just their upfront 
capital costs, but also the ongoing operational 
costs associated with operating that infrastructure. 
Specifically, projects that impose a substantial 
recurrent cost on government budgets are now less 
likely to receive government support than those 
that, at a minimum, are able to generate a sufficient 
enough return to cover their operating expenses.
Defining the size of  
our infrastructure challenge
There are numerous estimates which quantify the scale of the infrastructure 
challenge facing Australia. Infrastructure Partnerships Australia and 
Citibank have put the amount of infrastructure needed to be built over the 
next decade at $700 billion,10 the Business Council of Australia at $450 
billion to $770 billion,11 while Infrastructure Australia has provided a more 
conservative estimate of $300 billion over the next 10 years.12 
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In financial terms this means that, in most 
instances, government funds capital projects 
to develop structures and facilities which, once 
completed, also require ongoing funding in order to 
deliver services.  
For example, a hospital is not just a building but is 
also an important – though expensive – provider of 
health services. The choice to provide that hospital 
was done out of a desire to improve community 
services, despite a recurrent operational cost on 
top of the initial upfront construction costs.  
Consequently, any analysis of the adequacy of 
infrastructure should also consider the resulting 
affordability of the services delivered by that 
infrastructure. 
Figure 2 provides an analysis of the capital and 
operational expenditure mix for eight selected 
services. 
Some government agencies have a small capital 
component in comparison to their operational 
requirements and others, such as roads, have a 
major capital component. It is important to draw this 
connection between these two types of expenditure 
because the financial impact of infrastructure is not 
just the initial cost of capital. In many instances there 
is also a significant ongoing cost. 
In the public’s mind, this recurrent cost is largely 
hidden. Most road users only feel the cost of the 
roads they are using when they hit a toll. Equally, 
most public transport users don’t realise that their 
tickets are heavily subsidised. For rail users, ticket 
Classifications of 
infrastructure & their 
impacts on the budget
When assessing the adequacy of our infrastructure investment, it is 
important to understand that infrastructure is essentially a platform from 
which to provide services to the community and to support the economy. 
FIGURE 2: 2012/13 OPERATIONAL AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE MIX FOR SELECTED SERVICES
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fares recover just 19.8% of recurrent operational 
costs.16 The government however cannot forget 
this cost, nor can potential private investors with 
which the government might partner. 
It is also important to note that not all capital works 
expenditure is on new infrastructure. Government 
also needs to provide capital funding to replace and 
upgrade existing assets. In some cases this capital 
also generates a need for recurrent expenditure. 
Figure 3 summarises infrastructure investment as it 
relates to service delivery.
From this perspective, the three groups of 
infrastructure investment are: 
GROUP 1: 
INVESTMENT ON EXISTING  
ASSETS – SERVICE MAINTENANCE
 Replacement of old schools and hospitals in 
areas with no demand growth
 Replacement of bus fleets on existing routes
 New trains on existing lines – with no capacity 
increase
 Road maintenance without increasing traffic 
capacity
 Replacement of public housing
GROUP 2: 
INVESTMENT ON EXISTING  
ASSETS – SERVICE GROWTH
 Replacement of schools and hospitals in areas 
with demand growth
 New, more efficient  trains on existing lines – 
leading to capacity increase
 Road upgrades leading to increased traffic 
capacity
GROUP 3: 
INVESTMENT ON NEW ASSETS
 New technology
 New schools and hospitals
 New bus, light rail and train routes
 New public housing
IN GENERAL:
 Infrastructure investment in Group 1 does not 
lead to additional recurrent costs – in fact, at 
times the new facilities might be able to achieve 
operational efficiencies leading to recurrent 
savings.
 Infrastructure investment in Group 2 leads to 
additional recurrent cost when the efficiencies 
and economies of scale of the upgraded facility 
cannot meet the additional funding requirement 
of expanded service capacity.
 Infrastructure investment in Group 3 leads to 
significant adtditional recurrent cost.
FIGURE 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY
Capital Funding Recurrent Funding
Infrastructure 
Investment
Asset 
Replacement New Assets
Group 1 
Service Maintenance
Group 2 
Service Growth
Group 3 
Investment on New Assets 
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In this report we have classified infrastructure 
investments into three distinct classes:
 Infrastructure for services which deliver sufficient 
revenues to cover operational costs, the cost of 
capital, and which deliver a positive financial 
return to government;
 Infrastructure for services which deliver sufficient 
revenue to cover operational costs but which 
cannot cover the cost of capital investment. 
This infrastructure requires a capital subsidy 
from government; and
 Infrastructure for services which do not deliver 
sufficient revenues to cover operational costs. 
This infrastructure requires both a capital and 
recurrent subsidy from government.
Figure 4 illustrates this classification for eight 
selected service delivery areas.
Figure 4 reflects that: 
 As Category A assets, Sydney Water and NSW 
electricity companies can and do operate as 
profitable entities;
 Bus Services and Public Housing are 
considered Category B assets in that they 
generate sufficient revenues to cover their 
operating cost, but not enough to fund capital 
replacement and expansion;
 While RailCorp does generate significant 
revenue, it remains a category C asset in that 
the majority of its operational costs are still 
funded through a public subsidy; and
  Health and Education generate a low level of 
revenue in comparison with their service costs 
and the operational costs of these services are 
almost entirely funded through a government 
subsidy. This places them firmly in Category C.
The three classes of 
infrastructure investment
It is useful to classify infrastructure assets according to the funding 
requirements they generate – not only in terms of capital expenditure but 
also in terms of the level of recurrent subsidies that may be required to 
cover the operational costs associated with delivering services. 
FIGURE 4:  
SELF- GENERATED INCOME AS A % OF OPERATIONAL EXPENSES FOR SELECTED SERVICES
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Category C is the hardest infrastructure to fund in 
that it delivers new growth in services which do 
not operate as a profitable business and which 
require a recurrent subsidy from government. In the 
private sector, capital investment occurs so that 
production can meet product demand and increase 
profitability. In the government sector, investment in 
Category C infrastructure projects generally leads 
to the ‘business’ model of the government budget 
becoming even less ‘profitable’ – as operational 
subsidies grow with service expansion. 
This explains why so much of the growth in recent 
state infrastructure spending has been directed 
toward Category A infrastructure programs. 
Money spent expanding the electricity network 
or the desalination plant can make a return to 
government. Comparatively, investment in public 
transport can often increase the recurrent liabilities 
of state government.  This goes some way towards 
explaining why transport infrastructure is left to 
languish in comparison with other infrastructure 
classes. 
In the following sections we will examine the recent 
history of infrastructure expenditure in NSW to 
better understand why some projects simply fail 
to materialise, despite their obvious need and 
generally strong levels of community support.
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By any measure, NSW has a vibrant and dynamic 
economy. Its people are some of the best educated 
and healthiest in the world.17 Education and health 
services are universally available. Its cities and 
towns are rated highly in terms of liveability and 
amenity.18 The lights stay on, the streets are mostly 
safe and clean.  
Nevertheless, the widespread perception is 
that we are suffering from a chronic backlog 
of infrastructure. From the outset, this report 
seeks to address the perception that successive 
governments have failed to keep up infrastructure 
spending. Media reports have reinforced a 
perception in the community that there has been 
a ‘lost decade’ in infrastructure spending and that 
government has failed to keep up with growing 
demand and a greater population.19
Despite this perception, growth in infrastructure 
expenditure has been reasonably consistent. 
As Figure 5 shows, over the past decade, NSW 
Government capital expenditure has increased in 
real terms - at a compound annual growth rate of 
3.8% per annum. 
Has NSW been 
underinvesting in 
infrastructure?
For some time now, the community in New South Wales has had a perception 
that there is an infrastructure deficit across the state. Is this true? And if there 
is a deficit, is this deficit consistent across all types of infrastructure?
FIGURE 5:  
NSW GOVERNMENT REAL INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURE 2003-2014
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There was a spike in spending following the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), largely attributable 
to the Commonwealth Government’s stimulus 
package. The only trend towards a lower level 
of capital works expenditure is found in the last 
three years - reflecting capital funding returning to 
pre-GFC levels. In any case, recent expenditure is 
still significantly higher in real terms than it was a 
decade ago – more than 45% higher.
It is also worthwhile examining where capital 
expenditure has occurred. Figure 6 beaks down 
capital expenditure into two sectors:
 The General Government Sector (GGS)  
which comprises Health, Education, Public 
Transport, Roads and other Government 
Departments; and
 The Public Trading Enterprise (PTE) Sector 
which comprises the major water and electricity 
utilities and public housing.
It is important to note that most capital expenditure 
has been directed towards the PTE sector, 
indicating an overwhelming preference for Category 
A investments. 
From 2003-04 to 2013-14, the NSW Government 
spent $144 billion on infrastructure, but as  
Figure 7 shows that more than half of this 
expenditure occurred in the PTE sector. 
Recent PTE capital expenditure has largely been 
used on upgrading NSW’s electricity network in 
order to improve network reliability and to reduce 
the number of brownouts and blackouts.20 It has 
also been used to augment Sydney’s water supply 
through the construction of a desalination plant to 
help make Sydney drought-proof.21
To the public, this is largely ‘invisible expenditure’ 
– it means that we continue to have appropriate 
water supply and that electricity works when 
FIGURE 6:  
NSW GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURE 2001-2013 SPLIT BY SECTOR
 
General 
Government 
Sector 
68.7b, 48%
Public 
Trading 
Enterprise 
75.2b, 52%
General Government Sector Public Trading Enterprises
B
IL
L
IO
N
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14
4.8 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.6
5.2 5.0
6.4
5.6
7.5
5.8
9.2
8.0
9.8
7.5
8.3
6.1
7.7
8.2 
6.6
8.7
5.5
FIGURE 7: 
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we need it. However, it is hard for the public to 
connect these two concepts, that is, a reasonable 
expectation to have running water and reliable 
electricity with the multibillion dollar government 
investment required to deliver this - $73 billion over 
the past 12 years. 
This report also notes that over the past two 
decades there has been a substantial investment 
in social infrastructure, despite the fact that 
most classes of social infrastructure would fall 
into Category C. This would indicate that it is 
indeed incorrect to state that there has been a 
‘lost decade’ of infrastructure funding. Almost 
all of Sydney’s hospitals have been rebuilt. Our 
essential services such as water, sewerage and 
electricity are relatively reliable compared to 
most other comparable countries. Our schools 
and universities are also of high international 
standards.22 While there are occasional failings, 
much of our infrastructure is very good.
When considering infrastructure expenditure as a 
whole, it would appear that NSW has been investing 
strongly, with a particular focus on utility upgrades 
and social infrastructure. However, it is also true that 
in some areas NSW struggles to provide adequate 
infrastructure. This is especially true for transport 
infrastructure where, by international standards, 
Sydney’s service levels and costs are poor.23
There is a legitimate question as to why transport 
infrastructure has received less support than 
investments in other Category C investment 
classes, including social infrastructure investments 
into schools and hospitals. Schools and hospitals 
are rated as deep Category C investments in that 
they require a significant operational subsidy in 
order to deliver their services. Despite this, they 
still manage to receive the vast bulk of the State’s 
recurrent and capital expenditure. Combined they 
consume approximately 50% of state government 
expenditure.24
A large part of the reason that such projects 
continue to receive funding despite their long 
term budgetary impacts is that there is a well-
established expectation within Australian society 
that the provision of these services will be universal 
and largely equitable. As such, taxpayers are 
often happy for these services to receive ongoing 
support through general government revenue. On 
the whole our citizens expect to experience a long 
and healthy life with a good level of education. 
Both state and federal government funding reflects 
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this. Notwithstanding changes in the most recent 
federal budget, both health and education have 
well established funding formulas to keep these 
services operating. There are Commonwealth/
State funding agreement for both. In some cases 
these formulas are supported by dedicated revenue 
streams, such as the Medicare Levy or NDIS levy. 
At the community’s insistence we have built, 
funded and maintained a universal health and 
education system, and despite recent debate 
over the ratio of federal/state funding, to date 
there remains a bipartisan political commitment to 
substantial federal government funding for schools 
and hospitals.  
The same cannot be said about transport services 
– road and public transport services often require 
significant operational subsidies but do not have 
a funding system to ensure universality. There 
is no Commonwealth/State funding agreement 
to support transport. When the Commonwealth 
does provide funding, it is often ad hoc and 
project specific. The current federal government 
was elected on a pledge to completely stop 
Commonwealth funding for public transport.25
Consequently, the lack of a dedicated federal 
government revenue stream to support the 
transport category of Category C infrastructure 
has meant that the NSW Government has been 
generally unwilling to invest in public transport 
projects that require significant recurrent subsides.
This can be seen in the litany of projects that have 
failed to get off the ground after being formally 
“announced” in previous infrastructure plans. The 
last few decades have seen numerous plans and 
schemes announced by successive governments 
to enhance our State’s infrastructure services.26  
Some have been large integrated schemes with 
a comprehensive programme of projects; others 
have been smaller discrete plans.  Successive 
plans have been launched as a considered, 
thoughtful, and realistic infrastructure programme 
with clear priorities. Almost every year has seen 
the release of a new plan promising bold new 
schemes to resolve the State’s long term transport 
problems. Each plan claims to be a carefully 
considered, costed list of infrastructure priorities. 
It is worthwhile re-examining which projects 
have actually been delivered beyond their initial 
promise. More importantly, it is also worthwhile 
looking at which categories of infrastructure get 
built and which don’t. 
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Case 
Study:  
Action for 
Transport 
2010
Action for Transport 2010 was 
a transport planning document 
launched in the lead up to the 
Sydney Olympics in 1998. We 
have chosen to examine this 
plan because sufficient time has 
elapsed since its release to be 
able to assess whether its listed 
projects have been implemented 
or not. It was also chosen 
because this strategy was larger 
and more comprehensive than 
many of the others and covered 
a variety of transport typologies.
The plan sought to articulate the list of 
transport infrastructure which Sydney would 
require in a post Olympics period and was 
trumpeted at the time as Sydney’s first 
integrated transport system blueprint. It 
promised 25 large new road, and public 
transport projects including “a fully funded 
rail blueprint [that] will deliver eight new 
rail lines by 2010...”27
The notable thing about Action for Transport 
2010 was that a large number of its transport 
projects were projects that would have 
required recurrent subsidies on top of the 
initial establishment costs of each project. 
In the following table we have listed the 25 
projects promised in the plan and examined 
which projects were carried out and which 
project were not.28 BU
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION STATUS
Eastern Distributor A 6 km link between Sydney CBD, Port Botany and Sydney Airport. Completed.
M5 East An Eastward extension of the M5. Completed
M2 to Gore Hill Motorway Extending the M2 to link up with the Gore Hill Motorway. Completed
City West Link An alternate route for traffic going in and out of the CBD from the western suburbs. Completed.
M7 (aka Western Sydney Orbital) A 39 kilometre north-south road linking the MS and Hume Highway near Liverpool to the M2 at West Baulkham Hills. Completed.
Cross City Tunnel  1.2 km tunnel Linking the Western and Eastern Distributors. Completed.
Parramatta Road Upgrade Major intersection improvements and the final stage of the City West Link.
Superseded by the 
Westconnex project.
Princes Highway Tidal Flow Scheme New Canal Road tidal flow system. Completed.
Victoria Road Upgrade Numerous small upgrades for Victoria Road. Completed.
New Transport Management Centre New technologies to better manage the State’s road network and enable quick response to traffic conditions. Completed.
Sydney Airport Link PPP rail project.
Completed, but with 
patronage levels continuing at 
well below original forecasts.
Bondi Beach Rail Link Extension of the Eastern Suburb Railway. Cancelled.
Parramatta-Chatswood Rail Link. A link between the Western, Northern and North Shore Line. Half built.
Epping-Castle Hill Line A new line servicing the North West metropolitan area. Superseded by the North West Rail Link.
Strathfield-Hurstville Line
First incarnation was the Hurstville-Bankstown line proposed. 
Later modified to link Hurstville with Strathfield, connecting the 
Eastern Line with the Southern Line, the Western Line, and the 
North Shore Line.
Cancelled.
Liverpool Y Link ‘Y’ shaped link near Granville station, linking South Western Sydney with Western Sydney using existing tracks. Completed.
High Speed Rail to Newcastle An $800 million high speed rail link from Hornsby to Newcastle. Cancelled.
High Speed Rail to Wollongong A $287 million high speed rail link from Sutherland to Wollongong. Cancelled.
Parramatta-Liverpool T-way
Blacktown-Wetherill Park T-way Not built.
Parramatta-Blacktown T-way Not built.
Blacktown-Castle Hill T-way Partially built from Blacktown to Parklea.
Parramatta-Rousehill T-way Completed. Renamed as the ‘North-West T-way’.
Penrith-St Marys T-way Not built.
Parramatta-Strathfield  T-way Not built.
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Sydney has had a long history of tolling roads, most 
famously for the use of the Harbour Bridge. Despite 
initial and significant opposition to tolls, the community 
grew to accept that tolls are a necessary impost to 
building an integrated road network. Tolls provide a 
model through which the public and private sector 
can finance and build new arterial roads. 
Over the decade that followed Action for Transport 
2010, a flurry of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
financed and built a series of major arterial roads 
across Sydney.  The only exception was the M5 
East, which was not tolled for political reasons.  
Of the road projects listed in Action for Transport 
2010 over 90% were successfully completed. Only 
the Parramatta Road upgrade was not completed 
but this was because it was superseded by the 
much larger Westconnex project. For the remaining 
projects, the private sector was able to finance the 
cost of operating these roads through tolls and user 
charges, helping to convert these individual pieces 
of infrastructure into valuable assets. In some of the 
later PPPs, competition to build, own and operate 
toll roads became so fierce that the private sector 
even bid to provide some of the initial cost of 
capital for construction.
In an environment of cut throat competition, many 
bidders overestimated patronage numbers or 
underestimated the construction costs in order to 
win the bid – this was a misjudgement on the part of 
the private sector rather than the state government. 
As a result of this competition, Sydney’s Cross City 
and Lane Cove tunnels failed financially and left their 
parent company in the hands of administrators.29 It 
was financial disaster for those who invested, but 
much of Sydney’s arterial roads still got built. 
The implications of these failures has not been 
lost on government. These and other high profile 
failures interstate have damaged the funding model 
and tempered private sector appetite for future toll-
road projects. 
The overwhelming view of potential investors in 
their submissions to the Productivity Commission’s 
recent inquiry into transport infrastructure was 
that the Government would now need to take 
on a larger proportion of both construction 
and patronage risk should they wish to secure 
additional private investment into greenfield 
infrastructure projects in particular.30 
For whom the road tolls
Those projects carried out from Action for Transport 2010 were overwhelmingly 
those that managed to augment their recurrent funding either through user 
charges or by the projects incurring only a minimal recurrent liability. For the 
proposed road projects, this was predominantly achieved through tolls. 
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In the case of the bus transit ways, despite having no toll, new 
investment was expected to result in improved efficiency and 
profitability for the buses which ran on them.31 Where this was 
demonstrated, the case for funding was made and the transit 
ways were built. As was highlighted earlier, buses are often able 
to fund their own operating expenses, and as such do not require 
recurrent subsidy from Treasury beyond the initial capital outlay. 
Of the rail projects, two were fully completed. The Y Link to 
Parramatta – a relatively low-cost project – was completed 
12 years late. The other rail project that was fully completed 
was the Airport Line, which was undertaken as a PPP. In 
this instance, poor patronage rates driven by high ticket 
prices meant that the private sector operators quickly went 
broke, leaving behind a legacy infrastructure asset which has 
consistently failed to meet expectations. 
One other rail project from Action for Transport 2010 was 
partially completed – the Epping to Chatswood line, a smaller 
portion of the much larger promised Parramatta to Chatswood 
line which remains unfunded and unrealised. The previous 
federal government offered to fund $2.1 billion of the capital 
cost to complete this project with the rest being matched by 
the NSW Government. Under this proposal, NSW would have 
only be required to contribute $500 million and would have 
secured a long desired new piece of infrastructure. While politics 
certainly played a major role in the eventual rejection of this offer, 
the overriding factor behind the decision not to proceed was the 
significant recurrent costs which would have had to be borne 
by the NSW Government in addition to the costs associated 
with also delivering the North West Rail Link.32 The newly 
elected O’Farrell Government indefinitely postponed utilizing 
the Commonwealth’s offer, and following the 2013 election, the 
Abbott Government has quietly shelved the proposal.33
On the whole, sixteen years after Action for Transport 2010 was 
released, less than 20% of the rail projects were carried out.
Sixteen years later, the projects which have 
been left unfunded are predominantly rail 
projects which would have required substantial 
recurrent subsidies following their completion. 
For these projects, the NSW Government was 
faced with the dual problem of first finding 
the initial cost of the capital works and then 
the recurrent subsidy required to provide the 
services that would flow from them. This is the 
fundamental problem which plagued Action 
for Transport 2010 as well as a substantial 
number of other transport infrastructure 
projects both before and since. It is a serious 
problem which is still plaguing us today. 
In many cases the gap between recurrent 
costs and service revenue could theoretically 
be funded through greater debt; however it is 
fiscally irresponsible to fund recurrent costs 
through debt.  Borrowing to fund recurrent 
expenses is the fast track to a Greece style 
financial collapse. 
The primary lesson from Action for Transport 
2010 is that, unless we resolve the issue of 
recurrent subsidies, state governments will 
continually fail to deliver an important segment 
of the transport infrastructure we need.
Public transport: 
where art thou?
Of the bus transit ways listed in  
Action for Transport 2010, less than 50% 
were carried out.
Conclusions 
from our 
case study
Action for Transport 2010 
demonstrates that it is primarily 
not the cost of capital which 
is preventing these projects 
getting built, but rather the 
recurrent implications of 
operating them.
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How does Sydney’s 
transport system actually 
stack up?
When considering the evidence that road projects have been vastly more 
successful in securing government funding than rail, it is important to 
acknowledge that commuter transit times in NSW remain substantially 
worse than in other comparable cities worldwide.
FIGURE 8:  
ONE WAY WORK TRIP TRAVEL TIMES: METROS OVER 4,000,000,000 – AUSTRALIA, CANADA & USA34
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Sydney’s average one-way work trip travel time is 34 minutes. This exceeds that of all similarly sized or larger 
metropolitan areas across the three countries, with the exceptions of the substantially larger cities of New York 
and Washington.
Anecdotally, many Sydneysiders also believe that Melbourne has a better public transport system than Sydney. 
The facts do not support this view. The 2011 Census shows that as commuters, Melbournians are more reliant 
on cars than Sydneysiders and that a higher proportion of Sydney commuters use public transport during their 
journey to work.35
FIGURE 9:  
MODALITY OF TRANSPORT ON THE WAY TO WORK FOR MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY
The reality is that Sydney has the most comprehensive public transport system in Australia, though this does not 
mean that Sydney’s public transport system necessarily functions at an adequate level.
Evidence would suggest that our public transport system fails to meet the community’s needs and expectations. 
Our trains, buses, and ferries perform poorly when compared to cities internationally. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) has ranked Sydney 21st out of 30 countries in terms of mass transit coverage, worse even than the vast 
sprawling city of Los Angeles. This is despite the fact that Sydney also scored second worst on the cost of public 
transport.36 Many families in Sydney have no public transport within an acceptable distance from where they live. 
For those commuters experiencing long travel times, this can have a negative effect on both productivity and 
family life.37
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As Figure 10 shows, it is also true that, in comparison with many cities around the world, Sydney has lower 
population density, which makes the provision of public transport harder and more expensive.
So while Singapore has a much better public 
transport system than Sydney, it is also true that, 
on average, Sydneysiders occupy four times more 
space than Singaporeans38 and that Singaporeans 
pay much more to own a car and to use their 
roads. In addition, Singapore has made a series of 
long term public policy decisions to favour public 
transport over the private vehicle.
It is arguable that in Sydney there has been a 
trade-off between good public transport and a 
good sized backyard. The average floor area of 
a free-standing house in Australia is 243 square 
meters, some 40% larger than 20 years ago. This 
makes Australian houses officially the largest in the 
world, with the average floor area now 10% larger 
than even the land loving Americans.39 Even once 
apartments are factored in, Australia still boasts the 
world’s largest average dwelling size of 214 square 
meters, while NSW dwellings boast an average size 
of 219 square metres.40
The failure to contain urban sprawl has directly 
undermined the business model of transport 
infrastructure projects. Buses travel further with 
fewer customers, train lines need to be built to 
locations that are farther and farther away, and 
fewer dwellings are delivered close to major 
transport routes, further undermining patronage 
numbers. 
Arguably, the failure to contain urban sprawl may 
well be forcing a number of transport projects 
deeper into Category C, further undermining the 
likelihood that they will ever secure government 
funding. This in turn may be holding back overall 
patronage rates on Sydney public transport.
FIGURE 10:  
SYDNEY’S POPULATION DENSITY AS A % OF POPULATION DENSITY IN SELECTED CITIES
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FIGURE 11:  
ANNUAL TRIPS IN THE SYDNEY TRAINS 2001-2012
FIGURE 12:  
% VARIATION IN ANNUAL TRIPS IN SYDNEY TRAINS 2001-2012
Figure 11 shows that over the past decade, train patronage in NSW has only increased modestly by a modest 
15%.41 This is an increase that only barely exceeds population growth over the same period of time.42
Figure 12 shows that much of that growth has resulted from improved services to and from Sydney airport rather 
than though substantial additional services to the community. In some regions; the number of trips has even gone 
backwards in spite of population growth.43
If NSW is to adequately boost productivity and workforce participation rates, particularly in Western Sydney 
where participation rates are already below average,44 the Government will need to invest to ensure that transport 
services are at a minimum able to keep up with population growth rates. 
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Sydney’s recent growth in patronage also compares unfavourably to the rest of Australia. Since 2001-02, most 
public transport patronage growth has occurred in other Australian cities.45
FIGURE 13:  
PUBLIC TRANSPORT PATRONAGE GROWTH BETWEEN 2001-12 AND 2011-12
Evidently NSW is lagging other cities when it comes to enticing its residents to use public transport. Lower 
patronage growth can also indicates less favourable revenue returns on those services that are provided. It is also 
possible that the failure to encourage stronger rates of patronage growth could be keeping a number of public 
transport projects in Category C for longer than otherwise might be the case if growth rates were higher.
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The cost of not investing 
in infrastructure
The shortage of infrastructure investment in public 
transport is a serious drain on the productivity 
of our cities. Workers are stuck in traffic or on 
unreliable or overcrowded public transport when 
they could be working or recreating. Congestion 
costs alone are forecast to cost the Australian 
economy some $20.4 billion per year by 
2020.46 The most efficient of manufacturing and 
agricultural businesses are too often thwarted in 
accessing our ports and international markets 
because of access and traffic issues.47
There is also a significant opportunity cost in 
not providing the infrastructure our city needs. 
Sydney has recently been ranked the seventh 
worst city in the world for congestion.48 Averaged 
over the whole day, road congestion results in a 
time penalty over free-flowing roads of some 33% 
in Sydney, while the delay nearly doubles during 
periods of peak travel.49
Notwithstanding the reality that delivering new public transport will often 
result in an additional recurrent cost to the state government budget, it 
must also be remembered that a failure to invest appropriately in new 
transport services can result in a high price being paid for the lack of 
connectivity in our cities. 
FIGURE 14:  
CONGESTION IN SELECTED CAPITAL CITIES IN 2013
City Congestion
Morning 
peak
Evening 
peak
Delay per hour 
driven peak 
period
Congestion 
change 
2011 to 2012
Sydney 33% 70% 67% 40 mins Increase of 1%
Perth 30% 55% 55% 33 mins Increase of 4%
Melbourne 28% 56% 54% 33 mins Increase of 1%
Adelaide 28% 50% 45% 28 mins Decrease of -1%
Brisbane 25% 45% 50% 28 mins Decrease of -1%
Canberra 18% 41% 34% 22 mins Decrease of -1%
Note: Percentages refer to the Increase in overall times when compared to a free-flow situation. 
For example, a congestion level of 12% corresponds to 12% longer travel times compared to a 
free-flow situation. Delay in minutes per-hour driven during morning and evening peak times is as 
compared to free-flow situations. For example, 22 minute delay per hour at peak times indicates 
that a one hour journey driven at free-flow times will take an additional 22 minutes at peak times.
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Australia’s cities are the powerhouse of its 
economy. Sydney produces more economic 
output than the rest of NSW combined and on 
its own is responsible for some 22.1% of national 
GDP.50 Improving the productivity and functionality 
of Sydney will have a significant impact on our 
future prosperity.  
There is also a social cost for not providing the 
connectivity and accessibility that other cities enjoy. 
It means that people’s quality of life is affected 
as they spend time commuting at the expense 
of family life and leisure. There is also a growing 
inequality of access for many communities as 
growth fails to be supported through concurrent 
infrastructure investments. 
This has left many newer, outer urban suburbs 
languishing without services or remaining 
undeveloped. It is in the area of land economics 
where this cost is felt greatest. Housing supply is 
affected by many different factors but transport is 
often the key. Providing new public transport is one 
of the best ways to increase the yield of housing per 
hectare or to making available new land for housing. 
While Sydney has appropriate funding models 
and finance to provide water, sewerage, power 
and telecommunications to support new housing 
supply, it still struggles to provide the transport 
necessary to make this housing attractive to 
potential residents. The result is that much of the 
recent new land supply for housing has remained 
undeveloped even though demand for new housing 
is strong.51 Sydney residents may already paying for 
the lack of investment in public transport through 
increased house prices and rents, as insufficient 
investment in new transport infrastructure acts to 
constrict new housing supply. This is particularly 
concerning given that Sydney is already suffering 
from a large shortage in residential housing.52
The highest cost that arises from the repeated 
failure to deliver adequate public transport can 
be seen in the breakdown of public confidence 
in the government’s capacity to deliver on its 
infrastructure promises. Decades of over promising 
and under delivering has heightened community 
skepticism about future projects. This breakdown 
in trust makes it less likely that government and 
the community will be prepared to undertake the 
sacrifices necessary to build the mass transport 
system that NSW needs.
Societies can do and do pay a great opportunity 
cost for the lack of investment in transport 
infrastructure both in terms of productivity and 
quality of family life. This report has already shown 
that offsetting the fiscal impact of an ageing 
population will require substantial increases in the 
nation’s population, productivity and participation 
rates.  
Given these economic and demographic 
forecasts, any evaluation of the merits of an 
infrastructure proposal purely on the level of 
recurrent subsidy required to sustain it is likely 
to be insufficient in adequately capturing the 
opportunity costs of not investing. 
This report is not suggesting that every infrastructure 
investment is necessarily a good investment for 
government, but rather that there are indirect 
benefits that also need to be taken into consideration 
when determining whether an infrastructure project 
is worthy of allocating funding to. 
Nevertheless, this report acknowledges that the 
long-term fiscal challenges facing governments 
will all but ensure that competition for government 
funding becomes even more fierce. To prepare for 
this, policy makers will need to consider innovative 
new proposals to help ensure that we can fund 
the infrastructure requirements of tomorrow 
without unduly undermining the fiscal sustainability 
of the budget. 
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Issues with funding new 
transport projects through 
higher levels of debt
Nevertheless, NSW Treasury has argued consistently 
that there is a limit to how much debt the State can 
carry.53 This view is fundamentally correct and goes 
well beyond the issue of maintaining the State’s AAA 
credit rating – the capacity of government to borrow 
is not unlimited and the dangers of over-borrowing 
are best illustrated through the fate of many European 
countries following the GFC. 
There are also suggestions that government should 
issue bonds to raise the capital that they need. Issuing 
bonds is just another way of borrowing money and 
carries the same risks as other forms of debt.  
In addition, for so long as NSW maintains its AAA 
credit rating, the government can generally raise funds 
at a much lower cost from the market than from bond 
investors. For example, this report notes that recent 
success of the NSW Government Waratah Bonds 
seems to have had more to do with securing Foreign 
Investor Visas for overseas investors rather than from 
any great demand within the community for state 
infrastructure bonds.54 
This report acknowledges that NSW is already carrying 
significant levels of debt. Figure 15 shows the NSW 
Government’s net debt and total net financial liabilities 
as a percentage of Gross State Product (GSP) for the 
GGS and PTE sectors as well as for the Non-Financial 
Public Sector (NFPS). The NFPS comprises the GGS 
and FTE sectors together.
There is often a perception that government is too reluctant to go into 
debt. It is true that in the past we were able to build the roads and rail we 
needed by taking a long term, intergenerational view. Funding infrastructure 
through debt allows the cost of new infrastructure to be spread across the 
life of the asset. 
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Figure 15 shows that from 2003 to 2013:
 Net debt in the GGS grew from 0.9% of GSP to 
2.8% of GSP;
 Net debt in the PTE sector grew from 4.1% of 
GSP to 5.9% of GSP; and
 Overall net debt in the NFPS grew from 5.0% to 
8.7%.
FIGURE 15:  
NET DEBT AS A % OF GSP 2003-13
FIGURE 16:  
NET DEBT AS A % OF NET FINANCIAL LIABILITIES
Furthermore, as Figure 16 shows, between 2003 and 2013 net debt as a proportion of net financial liabilities in the 
GGS grew from 10% to 19%. This means that budget sector borrowings (used to fund infrastructure for services 
like health and education) are now almost twice as significant in their contribution towards the State’s liabilities as 
a decade ago.
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The evidence suggests that before considering 
taking on higher levels of debt in order to fund 
new GGS projects, we must first acknowledge 
that this is already happening on a heightened 
scale than previously was the case. Reflecting this 
view, in 2012 Standard & Poors revised the NSW 
Government’s credit rating to ‘negative outlook’, 
and stated:
“In our view, there are increasing pressures 
on the New South Wales Government to 
increase its investment in infrastructure, 
[…] the ratings could be lowered if the 
state’s operating performance continues 
to weaken and does not provide NSW with 
the capacity to undertake its infrastructure 
program while managing its debt burden. 
The ratings could be revised to stable if 
there were a demonstration of revenue 
flexibility either through a strengthening of 
own source revenues or profitable asset 
sales, thereby allowing for greater capital 
investment without increasing the state’s 
debt burden.”55
Debt will and should continue to be an 
important source of funding for infrastructure. 
Notwithstanding that, it is hard to envisage how 
debt could be used to expand significantly the 
State’s capital program in the absence of increased 
revenues or without abandoning the prudential 
constraints that responsible governments should 
adhere to.
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Will revenue  
be sufficient to fund  
new transport projects?
It is clear that any decision to expand the state’s Category C infrastructure 
holdings would also necessitate an accompanying expansion in government 
revenue. As such, it is important to consider the sources of funding available 
to the NSW Government.
In 2013-14, the NSW Government received  
$60.4 billion in income from the following sources:
 Taxation: including transfer and stamp duties; 
payroll tax; land tax; taxes on motor vehicles; 
and taxes on gambling;
 Fines, regulatory & other revenues: 
Including fines; license and regulatory fees; and 
royalties;
 Dividends & Income tax equivalents: 
Including dividends from electricity; water; 
financial services; ports; and the Snowy Hydro 
Corporation;
 Sales of goods & services: Including fees for 
service; entry fees; rents and leases; patient 
fees and other hospital charges; court fees and 
road tolls;
 Investment Income: Including returns on 
managed bond investments (I.e. investments 
with NSW Treasury Corporation) and interest on 
bank deposits;
 Commonwealth Grants: Including General 
Purpose Payments (i.e. GST); and Specific 
Purpose Payments under national agreements 
and partnerships (i.e. health payments); and
 Other grants and contributions: Including 
contributions by electricity and water providers 
to the Climate Change Fund; by parents and 
citizens associations to schools; and payments 
from the Commonwealth to Home Care.
Figure 17 shows the proportion of income 
emanating from each of the above sources. 
FIGURE 17:  
NSW GOVERNMENT 
SOURCES OF 
FUNDING 2013-14
Commonwealth 
Grants, 27.28b, 
42%
Other grants and 
contributions, 0.98b, 
1%
Taxation, 24.13b, 
37%
Fines, regulatory 
& other revenues, 
4.05b, 
6%
Dividends & Income 
tax equivalents, 2.80b 
4%
Sales of goods & 
services, 5.61b, 
9%
Investment Income, 
0.59b, 
1%
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According to the latest budget figures, roughly 52% of NSW Government income is obtained through taxation, 
sales of goods and services (user-pays), as well as fines and regulatory revenues. These are the areas that the 
state government can control directly through fiscal policy. An additional 4% of revenue is obtained though 
dividends from PTEs.56
In 2013-14 dollars, Figure 18 shows the amount of revenue obtained from each of the above sources over the last 
decade. 
FIGURE 19:  
REAL TERMS VARIATION IN NSW GOVERNMENT SOURCES OF FUNDING 2003-14
Figure 19 shows the real terms variation of each source over the last decade using 2003-04 as the base year.
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FIGURE 18:  
NSW GOVERNMENT SOURCES OF FUNDING 2013-14
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FIGURE 20:  
REVENUE SPLIT COMPARISON 2004-09 AND 2009-14
These figures show that over the last decade:
 NSW Government revenues grew by 33% in 
real terms – a compound average growth rate 
of 2.89% each year. This compares with an 
average NSW population growth of 1.13% per 
annum;57
 Fines and regulatory charges as well as user-
pays grew above the average. In particular, 
revenue from fines and regulatory charges has 
more than doubled in comparison with 10 years 
ago;
 Revenue from taxation and investment 
income grew below the average. Returns from 
government investments collapsed with the 
GFC and is now at a similar level as it was 
ten years ago. Taxation revenue grew by a 
compound average growth rate of 2.3% per 
annum; and
 Dividends from PTEs; Commonwealth 
payments; and other grants and contributions 
grew consistently with overall revenue growth.
Figure 20 compares the sources of revenue in the 
first five years of the decade with the last five years. 
It shows that in this period there was a significant 
shift in the funding shares away from taxation into 
user pays, fines and charges.
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Figure 21 quantifies the shift in revenue sources between the two periods. It shows that if the funding shares in 
2008-13 had remained at the 2003-08 levels, there would have been an additional $11.7 billion collected from 
taxes (an average of $2.3 billion per annum) and $9.3 billion less collected from user-pays, fines and charges  
(an average of $1.9 billion per annum).
FIGURE 21:  
REVENUE TRANSFERS 2004-09 AND 2009-14
Over the last decade, the NSW Government has 
been able to increase the revenues it collects. If the 
delivery of government services is to be maintained 
and improved, it will have to continue to do so. 
Any expansion of Category C transport 
infrastructure will inevitably require additional 
sources of recurrent funding. This will be made 
more difficult by concurrent demand growth 
forecast for health services, driven by population 
growth, ageing and technological improvements.58 
Competition for the growth dollar will be fierce. 
NSW Treasury estimates that “without policy 
change, budget expenditure growth will outpace 
revenue growth every year for the next 40 years”.59 
It is evident that should the state wish to expand its 
investment in Category C infrastructure, it will have 
to either increase revenues, decrease subsidies, 
and/or cut spending in other areas. In the context 
of public transport; the state government will 
either need to either find new ways of collecting 
additional revenue which can be dedicated to 
provide operational subsidies for public transport 
expansions, or it will have to significantly increase 
the price of public transport tickets. 
If it fails to pursue either of these two options, it 
will likely have to restrict growth funding in other 
sectors of public expenditure including health and 
education – perhaps the least acceptable option of 
all.
None of these options are politically palatable: tax 
more, charge more for new services, or cut existing 
services. From a purely political perspective, 
the easiest path to take would be to minimise 
the expansion of Category C infrastructure. Not 
coincidentally, this is exactly what has happened. 
If the state government is to provide the 
infrastructure necessary for boosting our 
population, productivity, and participation rates, it 
will need to find new sources of revenue to close 
the gap between recurrent costs and revenue on 
transport infrastructure projects.
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Category C infrastructure will almost never 
generate enough revenue on its own to make 
it a viable financial investment by the NSW 
Government. The recurrent subsidy for new 
services combined with the cost of capital 
puts the price of these projects beyond the 
state’s capacity to deliver without drawing 
down on an already shrinking revenue base. 
However, by utilising innovative new funding 
mechanisms, it is plausible that recurrent 
costs could be either partially or wholly offset 
by combining service revenue with other 
revenue streams. 
By closing the recurrent funding gap, 
a number of transport projects could 
theoretically be migrated from Category 
C infrastructure over into Category B. 
Even if initial construction costs are unable 
to be recovered, removing a project’s 
recurrent costs from the state budget would 
substantially increase the likelihood of that 
project going ahead. 
One option for ensuring fiscal sustainability would be 
to simply increase the tax base to offset the state’s 
increased recurrent liabilities. While this is a perfectly 
valid solution in its own right, the policy reality remains 
that this approach would likely be both politically and 
economically difficult to implement, notwithstanding 
the constitutional constraints on what states are 
allowed to tax. 
Nevertheless, evidence does suggest that community 
resistance to new or higher taxes can be overcome if 
the community believes that the funding will be wholly 
directed to a clear public good with a tangible social 
benefit. 
London has been able to build broad support for its 
city wide congestion tax by ensuring through legislation 
that the full amount of net revenue raised by the tax is 
Tackling 
the funding 
problem
If NSW is going to deliver an 
appropriate level of transport 
services, the state will need 
to find new ways to fund the 
currently subsided operating 
costs associated with Category C 
transport projects. The state will 
also need a new funding model 
which moves these types of 
infrastructure toward some level 
of cost recovery. 
Efficient 
and popular 
hypothecated 
taxes
There are very few international 
examples of public transport 
infrastructure which does not require 
some sort of recurrent subsidy. 
Even Sydney buses – NSW’s most 
profitable form of public transport 
– cannot cover their cost of capital. 
New bus transit ways and buses 
themselves often require a capital 
enhancement through the state 
budget.60 Notwithstanding this, other 
countries have been able to expand 
their services while maintaining a 
solvent treasury.
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directed towards public transport.61 The London 
congestion charge raises over £120 million each 
year.62 Most of this funding is spent upgrading and 
extending the London Underground. 
While the congestion charge does appear 
to have failed its original policy intention of 
reducing traffic congestion, it has proven to be 
politically popular. It has withstood changes 
in political administrations and changed the 
economics of public transport in London. Public 
subsidies are still required to fund expansions 
and improvements in the network, but the extra 
recurrent money provided through the congestion 
tax has made such investment more economically 
sustainable for both the public and private 
sectors. As a result, investment in London’s public 
transport network has increased significantly.  
Even following the GFC, public transport in 
London is now growing at its fastest rate in 
generations – both in terms of patronage numbers 
and network coverage.63 
Similarly Singapore has also managed to fund 
much of its public transport through a range 
of taxes, charges and fees on private vehicles. 
Singapore has funded much of its public transport 
through a congestion tax that has been in operation 
since 1975 and which is regularly held up as an 
international example of how to secure recurrent 
funding for public transport investment.64
This report argues that in the future a Central 
Business District (CBD) congestion tax could be 
used to raise additional revenue which could then 
be hypothecated to delivering improvements in 
state public transport improvements. 
In addition to new congestion taxes, a 
hypothecated Metropolitan Infrastructure Levy is 
one possible option that could help to bridge the 
recurrent expenditure gap. Land is relatively under 
taxed in NSW. Most citizens are only liable to pay 
Local Council rates and NSW has the lowest per 
capita rates of any jurisdiction in Australia.65 An 
average $100 levy on each rates notice would 
raise an estimated $180 million from 1.8 million 
residential and non-residential rate payers in 
Greater Sydney each year.66 If this funding was 
hypothecated directly to expanding and improving 
the public transport network it would make a 
significant impact on the recurrent expenditure gap. 
There are obvious equity and fairness issues 
with such a levy but these may be overcome by 
localising the levy to certain Local Government 
Areas or directing them to communities which will 
benefit the most. It should also be remembered 
that these levies are aiming to overcome the 
existing inequality of access within the community 
with regards to public transport. 
Hypothecating such taxes and levies may also 
make them more politically palatable. As with 
the London congestion tax, the NDIS, and the 
Medicare Levy, evidence suggests that people are 
often prepared to pay more on the proviso that the 
funds are dedicated to a service that could at some 
point directly benefit them. 
Hypothecated taxes and levies have had a 
chequered history in NSW. There may exist 
concern within the community that government will 
simply take any new revenue raised and fold it into 
consolidated revenue. This was the case with 3+3 
Black Spot Petrol Levy, originally established as a 3 
cent levy on every litre of petrol for 3 years with the 
intention that money collected would be directed 
to funding urgently needed upgrades at accident 
black spots on NSW roads. The money raised was 
far greater than the Black Spot Program needed 
however, and the excess revenue was used by 
Treasury for other programs.  
If new taxes or levies are to be introduced, the 
ability to utilise that money for other purposes must 
be constrained. Road tolling has only become more 
acceptable and widespread because road users 
can perceive an immediate benefit from their toll. 
If hypothecated taxes are to be accepted by the 
community, any revenue generated must be strictly 
spent only on those services for which the revenue 
was raised. The economic success and public 
support for London’s congestion tax reinforces the 
contention that people are often prepared to pay 
additional tax on the proviso that there is certainty 
surrounding the public benefit that will directly flow 
from that tax.
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Charging the 
users of rail 
and roads
RAIL CHARGES 
User charges also provide a potential mechanism 
for closing the gap in recurrent expenditure. Public 
transport fares in Sydney are already one of the 
most expensive in the world and the capacity to 
increase them beyond inflation is limited.67 There is 
also evidence to suggest that a modal shift away 
from public transport could occur once ticket prices 
gets too high.68 
This is supported by the persistently low patronage 
rates on the Airport Rail Link. Despite competitive 
travel times, the Airport Link has historically failed 
to meet patronage expectations. In 2005, the line 
carried an estimated 14,000 people per day, over 
70% less than originally forecast.69 
This has significantly improved in recent years. 
Renewed marketing, improved service reliability, 
upgrades to station infrastructure, and an 
ownership change in 2008 all contributed to a 
25% increase in station activity. Nevertheless, 
Airport Link patronage still fails to meet original 
expectations, and growth has to date been 
insufficient to mitigate increased airport road 
congestion. This is due to a number of factors; 
though the most prominent of these is the cost of 
rail fares.70 
That Sydney Airport users frequently choose to 
use private vehicles, taxis, or even walk to more 
affordable transport options indicates that the 
price elasticity of public transport is a substantially 
limiting factor in the capacity to cover recurrent 
funding costs through heavy fare increases. 
In most circumstances, demand for public transport 
is fairly elastic and people do make choices based 
on price. Nevertheless, there may still be some 
scope for increases in demand based pricing. 
During peak periods much of our public transport 
services operate at capacity and overcrowding is 
common. During these times alternative private 
transport modes are also likely to be at capacity, 
reducing commuter options. Consequently, there is 
less price elasticity during periods of peak demand, 
indicating that there might be some scope to 
increase user charges on public transport at certain 
times of day.71 The recent introduction of the Opal 
Card should make it easier for transport agencies 
to better match pricing to demand. City Rail already 
has some demand based pricing in its ticketing 
structure, though there is substantial scope to 
improve price targeting by expanding it to other 
transport modes including buses, ferries and light 
rail.
Infrastructure NSW has previously supported an 
increase in public transport user charges and is on 
the record as recommending that:
“Consistent with the NSW Commission of 
Audit, Infrastructure NSW recommends that 
the NSW Government reduce the proportion 
of funding that transport agencies receive 
from public subsidy to the levels determined 
as efficient by IPART. This will be achieved 
through a combination of operational 
efficiencies and modest fare rises.”
This report acknowledges that Sydney rail fares 
currently recover just 19.8% of recurrent operation 
costs.72 It is entirely appropriate that Government 
examine whether further moderate fare increases 
could be applied to some ticket categories, though 
any increase in user charges should only be 
implemented after appropriate consideration of the 
demand elasticity of the affected fare. 
It is important to understand that the scope for 
increasing user charges on the rail system relates 
to the time of day, not to distance travelled. 
There is an increasing socio-economic divide 
between the inner-city and the suburbs, and 
those in the suburbs are increasingly sensitive 
to fluctuations in price. Therefore the old system 
that charges commuters more, based on the 
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distance travelled has an unintended consequence 
of disproportionately affecting middle income 
Australians. 
TOLL ROADS
While increased user charges on public transport 
could provide some limited improvement in the 
funding of public rail transport infrastructure, 
a greater use of road tolling does has a far 
stronger likelihood of bridging the gap between 
recurrent costs and project revenue. Currently, 
just 253 kilometres of the nation’s roads are 
tolled, representing just 0.028% of the Australia’s 
total road network. Given the challenging fiscal 
environment facing state and federal governments, 
it is likely that user charges will increasingly become 
the norm for new road projects. Notwithstanding 
the high-profile failures of the Cross City Tunnel 
PPP and the CLEM7 Tunnel, the broader capacity 
of toll-roads to effectively fund themselves remains 
undisputed provided that appropriate diligence is 
taken when forecasting costs and demand. 
In most instances, road toll failures have largely 
been attributable to overly optimistic traffic 
forecasts being presented by private contractors 
during the initial bidding process. In 2010, 
University of Sydney academics Dr. David Hensher 
and Zheng Li undertook a comprehensive review 
of 14 Australian toll roads to compare actual and 
forecast traffic levels on 14 Australian toll roads. 
The study examined nine motor ways, three 
tunnels and two bridges, with the majority of these 
projects delivered via PPPs with varying degrees 
of government support. On average, actual traffic 
volumes were found to be 45% below the forecast 
levels.73 
In contrast, a 2005 analysis of 104 international 
toll roads, bridges and tunnels undertaken by 
ratings agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) found 
that patronage forecasts had overestimated traffic 
levels by an average 23% during the first year of 
operation.74 Whilst this research confirms that the 
issue of ‘optimism bias’75 remains a challenge for 
policy makers world-wide, it is deeply concerning 
that traffic forecasts for Australian projects have 
been substantially less accurate than the global 
average. Notwithstanding this, there are a number 
of Australian toll roads that have defied this trend, 
most notably Sydney’s Eastern Distributor and 
Melbourne’s CityLink. 
CityLink in particular is worthy of further 
consideration as it was identified by the Productivity 
Commission as a best case example. In 1995, 
the Victorian Government granted an exclusive 
licence to Transurban to design, build, finance, 
operate, levy tolls and maintain CityLink for 34 
years until 2034.76 Under the terms of the license, 
the majority of the risks associated with CityLink 
were transferred to Transurban, including patronage 
risk. This is notable because, unlike other toll 
roads, patronage on CityLink is actually exceeding 
forecasts.77 Most of the funding for the project is 
raised through tolling. CityLink uses distance-based 
tolling which is indexed to the consumer price 
index. Current toll caps are $6.93 for cars, $9.24 
for commercial vehicles during the day, and $6.93 
for commercial vehicles during the night. Once 
the contract expires, CityLink will be transferred 
to the Victorian Government. Assuming that the 
state government does not then remove the tolls, 
revenue from the road should more than adequately 
cover maintenance and operation costs associated 
with CityLink, with the high likelihood that there will 
be additional revenue available to potentially help 
fund other Category C transport projects. 
Given the widely different outcomes that have 
occurred on previous toll-road projects, it is critical 
that Government continuously review its PPP 
tendering processes with a particular focus on 
securing more accurate patronage forecasts so 
as to ensure that cost-benefit analyses are able 
to correctly judge the merits of each transport 
proposal. That recorded patronage levels have 
been an average 45% less than their first year 
forecasts is unacceptable and goes a long way 
towards explaining why many toll roads fall into 
Category C. Had initial forecasts more accurately 
predicted these lower levels of patronage, it is 
unlikely that many of these projects would have 
received a favourable cost benefit analysis. When 
public funds are used to deliver transport assets 
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that later fail to secure their anticipated level of 
revenue, the government is often required to 
apportion additional funding to offset this shortfall, 
further reducing the capacity of government to 
invest in other new transport projects. 
This report strongly supports the Productivity 
Commission’s recommendation that:
“All governments should commit to 
subjecting all public infrastructure 
investment proposals above $50 million 
to rigorous cost–benefit analyses that are 
publicly released and made available for due 
diligence by bidders. In general, analyses 
should be done prior to projects being 
announced. If a project is announced before 
analysis is done, for example, in the lead-up 
to an election, this should be conditional on 
the findings of a subsequent analysis.”
In recognition of the existing disparity between 
the resources of a party that is in government and 
a party that is not, this report recommends that 
the resources of Infrastructure Australia be made 
available to opposition parties in the same manner 
that the Parliamentary Budget Office is currently 
available for other policy costings. 
The Productivity Commission has argued that 
the mandatory public release of all cost-benefit 
analyse represents the single strongest reform 
for countering optimism-bias in patronage 
forecasting.78 Releasing a clear statement of the 
assumptions underpinning the analysis and the 
reasons for those assumptions will reduce the 
likelihood of decision makers being misled whilst 
also allowing for an independent analysis of the 
results.  
One useful tool for independently analysing 
patronage forecasts can be found reference class 
forecasting. Reference class forecasting provides 
a point of comparison by examining the outcomes 
of comparable past projects. It does not try to 
forecast the specific uncertain events that will affect 
the particular project, but instead places the project 
in a statistical distribution of outcomes based on 
those actually achieved for a set of similar past 
projects.79 
This report recommends that government tackle 
the widespread issue of optimism bias by agreeing 
to make greater use of reference class forecasting 
on all major transport projects. The results of this 
forecasting should be released along with any other 
cost-benefit analysis produced by the either the 
Government or its potential partners. The release of 
cost-benefit analysis should also include the release 
of any commissioned sensitivity analysis. 
In a fiscally constrained environment, reducing 
expenditure on poor value projects is as important 
as developing new revenue streams to support 
state transport projects. By accepting these 
recommendations, patronage forecasting errors 
would be substantially reduced. This would 
decrease the likelihood of future toll-road failures 
and ensure that government isn’t burdened with 
costly new Class C assets. 
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The term value capture refers to the identification 
and quarantining of the lift in rates revenue directly 
attributed to an infrastructure project. The captured 
revenue is then hypothecated towards covering the 
costs of that infrastructure. 
Currently, the NSW Government is actively 
pursuing a new light rail line linking Kensington 
and Randwick to the City. Much of its business 
case for recovering some of the cost of capital for 
this project is through significantly increasing the 
density around the new light rail terminuses.80 The 
NSW Government is a significant land holder in 
both of the Kensington and Randwick precincts 
and has already used its planning powers to push 
for much greater development potential at these 
sites.81 Public transport increases the housing yield 
of land through greater densification and this yield 
can then be hypothecated to fund some of the new 
service costs.  Whether this strategy is successful 
in this instance remains to be seen, though it 
remains likely that value capture will help recover 
some of the initial cost of capital and may make a 
small contribution to recurrent costs by increasing 
patronage on the service. 
This report acknowledges that the politics of 
value capture can be difficult. The community’s 
resistance to high density development is fierce and 
there is little recognition within the community that 
low density housing is often the greatest enemy of 
good public transport. Consequentially, the success 
of value capture is heavily linked to the ability of 
the government to convince the community that 
high density development is not just beneficial, but 
necessary. 
Both domestically and internationally, there is a 
long list of projects that have applied value capture 
levies on key beneficiary groups without incurring 
significant community opposition. London’s 
Crossrail project provides a good example of this. 
Crossrail is Europe’s largest construction project, 
the Crossrail route will run over 100km from 
Reading and Heathrow in the west, through new 
tunnels under central London to Shenfield and 
Abbey Wood in the east. There will be 40 Crossrail 
stations including 10 new stations.82
In a massive undertaking which is now being 
described as a ‘London tunnelling marathon’,83 
a total of eight tunnelling machines are being 
deployed to clear the way for 42km of new tunnels 
beneath London. Work started in May 2009 and 
there are currently over 10,000 people working 
across over 40 construction sites.84 
Tunnelling is now over 80% complete. Once 
complete in 2019, Crossrail will bring an extra 
1.5 million people to within 45 minutes of central 
London and will successfully link London’s key 
employment, leisure and business districts. 
Crossrail willalso support the delivery of over 
57,000 new homes and 3.25 million square metres 
of commercial space. An estimated 200 million 
passengers per annum will use Crossrail.85  
The project has an estimated cost £15.9 billion 
Expanding the use of value 
capture In Australia
Value capture mechanisms may also assist in funding new infrastructure. 
When government delivers new transport infrastructure to a community, 
property values in the area increase as a result. Value capture occurs when 
the government captures some of that increase through new taxation. 
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(just under $30 billion AUD). Project funding is 
drawn from a range of sources including the sale 
of surplus land, developer contributions, and 
revenue raised from ticket sales. Perhaps the 
most innovative funding mechanism introduced to 
help fund this project is the introduction of a new 
Business Rates Supplement (BRS) – i.e a levy on 
non-domestic property rates in certain London 
boroughs – that aims to raise £4.1 billion, or 26% 
of the project’s total capital cost.86 
The BRS will apply a levy of 2 pence per pound 
(2%) on non-residential properties with a (rateable) 
value of £55,000 or more in London. Over 80% of 
businesses in London are exempt from the BRS 
as their rateable value is below this threshold.87 
Though this was likely done for political expediency, 
the official policy justification advanced for the levy 
is that the project will increase commercial office 
values around Crossrail stations by some 10% over 
the next ten years above baseline projections.88 The 
supplement is expected to run for 24-30 years, or 
until the GLA’s initial upfront borrowing is repaid.89 
This report notes that had the threshold been set 
at a lower level, a substantially larger proportion of 
capital costs would have been recouped through 
the BRS. Equally, had the rate been set at a higher 
level, project debt would be repaid sooner.
Interestingly, the decision was also taken to not 
capture any of the value added to residential 
properties surrounding the Crossrail project despite 
the significant benefit that will flow to existing 
owners and property investors. The local housing 
markets along the Crossrail will inevitably benefit 
from both improved connectivity and the wider 
regeneration. Multinational commercial real estate 
company CBRE has calculated that by the time 
Crossrail becomes fully operational, house prices 
in benefitted areas will increase by 13% over and 
above wider underlying capital appreciation. In 
Central London, the overall increase is expected to 
be in the region of 20%.90 Nevertheless, a political 
decision was taken not to capture any of the value 
added to residential property.
It is impressive that a full 26% of the costs 
associated with Europe’s largest construction 
project are able to be recouped through the use 
of innovative value capture strategies. It is also 
worthwhile noting that a substantially higher 
proportion of costs could have been offset had the 
decision been taken to apply either a higher rate, 
a lower threshold, or a rate that was broadened to 
include residential properties as well. Nevertheless, 
the capacity for value capture to fund large 
transport projects has been well demonstrated 
by the Crossrail project. Equally as important, the 
method of funding has received bipartisan support 
and strong community backing. 
Australian policy makers should examine these 
value capture strategies for potential adaptation to 
the Australian context. It would also be worthwhile 
to considering whether such a rate supplement 
should be introduced on a permanent basis as 
a potential means to bridging the gap between 
operational revenue and operation expenses. 
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The idea is widely used in the United States where 
forty-nine states have adopted statutory frameworks 
enabling the use of TIF by local governments.
As part of its inaugural Homes for All report, the 
McKell Institute recommended that the state 
government examine TIF as a possible enabler of 
new infrastructure projects in areas slated for new 
housing supply.91 The Victorian Government, Urban 
Development Institute of Australia, and the Bus 
Industry Confederation have all also recommended a 
more thorough investigation of the potential to fund 
infrastructure through TIF as part of their respective 
submissions to the Productivity Commission’s recent 
inquiry into public infrastructure.92 93 94
The idea is also gaining traction in the United 
Kingdom, following substantial research by PwC 
on the evolution of the funding mechanism to suit 
the UK context.95 The UK TIF model is based on 
reinvesting a proportion of the future business rates 
from a designated area back into infrastructure and 
related development around that region. It applies 
where the sources of funding available for a program 
that deliver economic growth and renewal to a region 
cannot fully cover the initial cost of infrastructure 
required for regeneration. A local authority, private 
sector partner or some combination of both, acts as 
a lead agent and raises the funds upfront in order 
to pay for infrastructure. The funds are sourced on 
the basis that the increased business rates resulting 
from that regeneration will then be used to repay 
the initial investment. The upfront funding may be 
borrowed from public or private sources, or it may be 
provided by the developer engaged to conduct the 
regeneration from the capital already available to it. 
At the request of the Property Council of Australia, 
PwC has now undertaken research into the possible 
implementation of a TIF funding mechanism in 
Australia.96 It would be worthwhile for the state 
government to examine this research further when 
considering the possible application of TIF in NSW. 
In addition to the benefits associated with 
securing new funding streams to finance transport 
infrastructure, there are several other benefits to 
Treasury from pursuing TIF in NSW. Most notably, 
the state treasury would benefit from higher stamp 
duty revenues resulting from rising property values, 
higher income and corporate tax revenues due to 
more economic activity, and lower health, security 
and benefits costs as the community enjoys the 
social benefits of regeneration. Most importantly, 
the increased revenue from business and residential 
rates in the designated area will also be made fully 
available to the Treasury once the initial costs of the 
infrastructure have been paid off. 
There are of course a number of potential drawbacks 
to TIF that the state government needs to be 
conscious of, most notably the element of uncertainty 
over expected rates revenue and the risk that the 
expected increment fails to emerge. Moreover, unless 
government is willing to guarantee the returns, the 
price of borrowing may end up being higher than for 
standard government debt.97 
This report recommends that the state government 
further examine the potential for the future use of TIF 
in NSW.
Bringing Tax Increment 
Finance to Australia
Another possible mechanism for value capture lies in the use of Tax 
Increment Financing (TIF). TIF enables governments to collect additional 
revenue from increases in the value of properties adjacent to new 
infrastructure projects and to use those ‘incremental’ taxes to finance those 
projects that have triggered the property appreciation.
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JPD essentially enables an infrastructure provider to 
capture value through the development of adjacent 
real estate. Under this approach, the infrastructure 
provider jointly develops the real estate in and 
around the infrastructure assets in order to 
generate a revenue stream that will offset the cost 
of its provision. 
The most common example of joint property 
development models is where councils make use 
of the planning process (outside of development 
charges regimes) to collaborate with developers 
in the delivery of infrastructure. The “carrot” 
of planning approval can often be a powerful 
instrument to persuade private developers to 
either build or to provide funding towards new 
infrastructure. 
In addition to providing a stable and abundant 
source of income, by developing residential and 
commercial property in the precinct immediately 
surrounding a train station, more residents and 
employees are likely to use those transport facilities, 
thereby allowing transport projects to generate 
efficiencies through greater economies of scale. 
Successful examples of JPD include Chatswood 
in Sydney and Melbourne Central where air rights 
were used to build major retail and residential 
complexes in exchange for building station 
precincts.98 Internationally, much more extensive 
partnerships can be found in Hong Kong, Tokyo 
and Singapore where JPD has become a critical 
funding mechanism for both the development and 
operation of new rail lines.
Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
(MTRC) is worthy of special commendation in that, 
unlike most public transport systems in the Western 
world, Hong Kong’s metro is not perpetually 
subsidised by Government. Instead the system 
operator is self-funded through the fare box, 
commercial station retail rent, joint residential and 
commercial property development value capture, 
and other transport oriented developments.99 
Hong Kong’s MTRC was established in 1975 with 
an initial capitalization of HK$500 million.100 Its 
entire system now stretches 218.2 km and has 84 
stations and 68 light rail stops.
Hong Kong’s MTRC owes its success and 
profitability largely due to the revenue that is raised 
through its real estate business. The MTRC has 
used JPD to allow the development of shopping 
malls on and around twelve of its stations. As 
part of this arrangement, MTR Corporation then 
receives a proportion of the profits from the malls, 
which is then reinvested back into the network.101 
Between 1998 and 2013, profits generated from 
property operations have doubled that initial 
amount spent on railway.102 
Whilst Hong Kong’s significant urban density 
undoubtedly helps to ensure that Joint Property 
Developments are financially lucrative for the 
MTRC, the capacity to utilise similar mechanism in 
Australia remains strong. In recognition of this, the 
NSW Government has embarked on an ambitious 
plan to partner with private partners in a major 
redevelopment of the rail corridor spanning Central 
Station to Eveleigh. The Government estimates that 
over one million square metres of new floor space 
could be made available along the 3km renewal 
Joint Property Development
Another option for value capture lies in the greater use of Joint Property 
Development (JPD). JPD is where government partners with private 
developers to create funding opportunities to assist with the building of rail 
transport infrastructure and surrounding station precincts. 
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corridor, potentially providing space for high density 
housing, commercial office space, or an expansion 
of tertiary education facilities.103  
UrbanGrowth NSW has completed a Baseline 
Analysis of the existing rail corridor. The Baseline 
Analysis found that there was a significant 
presence of government owned land within the 
Corridor, particularly outside Heritage Conservation 
Areas.104 Although consultations are still underway, 
the Government has announced its ambition to 
strategically release land packages or sub-precincts 
to potential developers in multiple stages over a 20 
year time frame. It is anticipated that the program 
will fund major redevelopments at both Central and 
Redfern Station. 
The provision of previously unavailable government 
land for commercial and residential development, 
in combination with the granting of air rights above 
train stations, provides a substantial opportunity 
for private developers to access one of the last 
untapped spaces in the Sydney CBD. In delivering 
the Central-Eveleigh revitalization project, the 
Government should look to Hong Kong’s MTRC 
as a best-practice model on which it can model its 
project delivery. When developing similar projects 
in Hong Kong, the MTRC includes profit sharing 
mechanisms in each of its agreements with the 
private developers.105 For residential projects, 
MTRC will receive an agreed portion of the profit 
generated by the sale of those unites if the private 
partner manages to sell all the units before the 
contractual deadline. Otherwise, MTRC will obtain 
the unsold units and then determine whether to 
sell or lease in the open market. For shops and 
office units, MTRC generates profits by leasing 
directly with developers or by keeping part of the 
assets developed to generate long-term rental 
income. Similar agreements should be made as 
part of the Central-Eveleigh redevelopment project, 
with excess revenue hypothecated back into the 
broader transport portfolio as a means to covering 
the shortfall between system-wide operating costs 
and ticket revenue.  
This report also recommends that the NSW 
Government direct UrbanGrowth to undertake 
a broader analysis of other railway stations and 
corridors which could potentially benefit from 
similar JPD initiatives. The likelihood of further 
JPD being is heavily correlated with whether or 
not the Government is successful in facilitating 
more Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) 
along Sydney’s rail transit network. To that end, 
planning reform must take into account the need 
to encourage greater use of TOD through more 
accessible rezoning of land and a greater use 
of ‘code assessable’ development in the areas 
immediately surrounding train stations. 
Locking in planning reform prior to negotiations 
over future potential JPD will substantially reduce 
planning and development risk for potential private 
investors. This would inevitably result in more 
favourable terms being negotiated within each JPD 
agreement, further increasing the likelihood that 
JPDs will deliver addition revenue streams that 
the NSW Government can then redirect towards 
bridging the existing transport funding gap.
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Proponents of this scheme have suggested that 
state and territory governments are well placed 
to privatise a number of their existing assets, 
including most commonly those Category A 
assets which are already operating as a profitable, 
revenue generating business.106 Collectively, 
Infrastructure Australia has estimated that 
Australian government’s collectively possess 
some $92 billion in such assets on their balance 
sheets.107 
Infrastructure Australia has recommended that 
government ‘unlock’ the capital invested in these 
profitable assets in order to ‘recycle’ that funding 
into new productivity enhancing infrastructure.108 
This may present a valid option in those instances 
where the financial gain to government exceeds 
the net present value of future dividends that 
the asset would otherwise have produced. 
However, this report notes that such an outcome 
is only likely to be achieved when the proceeds 
of sale are used to generate new Category A 
investments. The sale of Category A assets to 
fund Category C projects would unlikely assist 
the fiscal sustainability of the state government’s 
budget over the long run. 
This report accepts that government should not 
be a museum of public assets – public ownership 
is not in itself an outcome, it is just a delivery 
mechanism which often is required to make sure 
services are available. 
The Government has a responsibility to make sure 
that the community has the services it needs. 
Sometimes asset ownership is essential for this 
purpose and sometimes regulation will suffice. 
Over time, service needs change and government 
should respond through different ownership and 
regulation strategies. Fifty years ago there was 
no perceivable need for substantial government 
investment into the construction of a National 
Broadband Network. Today, only government is 
in a position to make that upfront investment. 
Similarly, fifty years ago, only government could 
make the required investment to deliver airports 
and a national airline. The important thing is not 
who owns the assets but rather to make sure that 
services are delivered safely, appropriately and at 
a level which meets the community’s expectations. 
However, this report also recommends caution 
against asset ‘fire sales’. Privatisation of Category 
A assets can reduce the recurrent income for 
government obtained through dividends and as a 
result can also reduce its capacity to carry debt. 
From the point of view of the State’s balance 
sheet, this strategy can often equate to selling 
profitable businesses to expand services that 
make a loss. 
It must also be acknowledged that there are a 
limited number of Category A assets currently 
owned by the NSW Government. Unless the 
sale of these assets is used to build new, equally 
profitable Category A assets, then this approach 
to funding infrastructure will inevitably reach a 
point at which the option for “asset recycling” is 
Asset recycling,  
a downward spiral
Another mechanism recently being promoted as a means of funding new 
transport infrastructure is asset recycling. Asset recycling occurs when  
state-owned infrastructure is privatised in order to raise funds for the 
construction of new greenfield projects. 
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no longer available to government.
This report contends that the argument for 
privatisation should only be made on a case by 
case basis and in the context of the overall impact 
on the state’s finances – both in the short and 
long term. Most importantly, it would be useful if 
public debate on privatisation were conducted 
in a less emotionally charged environment – with 
less ideology and more facts. When considering 
potential asset sales, decisions should be based 
on the specifics of the proposed sale. It should 
never automatically assume that:
 Public ownership is the only way to deliver the 
service;
 The private sector is always better at managing 
and delivering services; and
 The capital injection to government from the 
sale will compensate for long term recurrent 
loses.
 Potential sales should also demonstrate that:
 Appropriate and effective regulation can be 
implemented;
 The sale does not lead to private monopolies;
 Service quality will be maintained;
 The sale results in an equal or improved 
financial position for the State in terms of 
available capital, long term recurrent income 
and future capacity to service debt; and
 The financial benefits of the sale can be 
applied to areas where government funding is 
required to improve and expand services.
The last point is of particular importance to 
ensuring community support for the concept of 
‘asset recycling’.
Asset recycling, TIF, JDP, and other value capture 
mechanisms can all be appropriate tools in helping 
deliver particular types of infrastructure at specific 
times, though none of them are a panacea on their 
own. If we want to provide growth in Category C 
infrastructure we have to face the fundamental 
truth that it will cost more – and that this cost will 
not only be capital but also operational. As such, 
each of these strategies should ideally be adopted 
in conjunction with an appropriate degree of user 
charging.
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While both an increase in the level of private sector 
involvement and an increase in the level of public 
debt can both play a part in delivering the capital 
for new transport infrastructure, neither approach 
will on its own address the funding shortfalls which 
necessitate recurrent subsidies for Category C 
infrastructure. The challenges of infrastructure 
financing and infrastructure funding are quite 
separate; while the solution to one problem does 
not necessarily provide a solution to the other. 
The distinction between finance and funding needs 
to be clear: a funding source must be present to 
support finance. This is a critical point because the 
availability of capital or financial products does not 
obviate the funding requirement. Funding refers to 
how infrastructure is paid for, which in the case of 
transport infrastructure, will ultimately be sourced 
from either government investment or direct user 
charges. Financing on the other hand refers to the 
way in which debt and/or equity is raised for the 
delivery and operation of an infrastructure project. 
There are varied views within 
business and the community 
on how to address the current 
infrastructure shortfall facing 
NSW and Australia more broadly. 
These often include more private 
sector involvement, increased 
government debt, or increased 
government revenues. 
Financing 
appropriately 
funded  
transport  
projects
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While the challenges surrounding the funding and 
financing of infrastructure are quite separate, they 
are also interrelated. The ability to secure financing 
for the construction of a new road project will be 
heavily influenced by the strength and source of the 
revenue stream that will flow from it. 
Whilst this report is predominantly focussed on the 
issue of infrastructure funding, it is also appropriate 
to examine the costs associated with the financing 
of major transport projects. 
If private financing for a project is unable to be 
secured in as competitive an environment as 
possible, the overall cost borne by taxpayers and/
or users of that infrastructure is likely to be higher 
than would otherwise be the case. If a potential 
Public Private Partnership transport project is 
put out to tender with an expectation that it will 
supported by a negotiable degree of government 
revenue, then a smaller pool of bidders could 
potentially result in a higher degree of negotiated 
government support. This could come in the form 
of higher availability payments, a greater share of 
risk being born by taxpayers, or through a higher 
quantum of public subsidy per user. 
For Category C projects that require continuous 
subsidies to cover their recurrent operational costs, 
higher than necessary financing costs could also 
create a larger disparity between service revenue 
and operational costs. 
To appropriately address this issue, it is important 
to consider whether reforms exist that can help 
improve the financing prospects of major transport 
projects.  Sourcing finance at appropriate cost and 
tenor – and in sufficient volume for major transport 
projects – remains challenging in the current 
economic environment.  
This is particularly true for greenfield projects. 
Greenfield infrastructure development involves 
the construction of new assets for which there 
is no pre-existing demand for the service exists. 
Greenfield projects also frequently require a 
degree land acquisition and risk associated 
with environmental and planning approvals. 
Consequentially, they not only face higher levels of 
demand risk arising from the uncertainties inherent 
in patronage forecasting, they also involve a 
substantial degree of construction-cost risk.  
By contrast, brownfield projects involve assets for 
which demand for the service is already known and 
where construction costs are more predictable.
This large differential in risk means that there are 
now at least eight major infrastructure investors 
in Australia that typically will not participate in 
greenfield PPP projects either as a bid sponsor 
or primary equity investor.109 This has obvious 
implications for new transport projects being put 
out for competitive tender. 
The hesitance of these investors to engage with 
greenfield transport projects is also heightened 
by very high bid costs and long procurement 
processes with ‘patchy’ deal flow, which limits the 
number of investors that can afford to dedicate 
large teams to bidding on those projects.110 111    
Making it easier for new organisations to invest in 
greenfield transport projects would substantially 
enhance the number of competitors engaged with 
project tenders. Enhanced competition would 
likely reduce the scope of negotiated availability 
payments and recurrent subsidies contained within 
any final agreement. This in turn could help minimise 
the discrepancy between service revenue and 
operational costs on Category C transport projects 
delivered and operated by the private sector.
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Monoline insurance companies sell insurance 
against default by a bond issuer. Monolines lend 
their higher credit rating to less creditworthy 
infrastructure debt issuers in order to provide the 
bond issuer with a reduction in borrowing costs. 
Once the guarantee has been provided, each 
monoline insurer then reinsures a large part of its 
risk with other insurance companies in the market. 
Since the GFC, nearly all of these specialist 
monoline credit reinsurance providers have suffered 
significant financial losses and/or exited the 
market. They are not expected to have the financial 
resources or capital backing to be able to re-enter 
the Australian market for another decade.113  
The exit of monoline insurers has left a substantial 
gap in commercial credit reinsurance markets 
for greenfield infrastructure in particular, and has 
meant that bond finance has become unavailable 
or unaffordable for many PPP projects. Both 
Lend Lease and the Victorian Government have 
suggested that this gap has since induced a 
greater reliance on shorter-term bank debt for the 
financing of new transport projects.114 115    
This report also notes that Australia’s corporate 
bond market is small compared to other major 
developed economies, making it harder for 
companies to access public debt markets 
directly. Westpac’s submission to the Productivity 
Commission highlighted that while the corporate 
bond market in showing some positive signs that 
it is continuing to develop, there remains limited 
evidence to suggest that there is improved investor 
appetite for “greenfield” project bonds, with all new 
greenfield projects since the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) being financed by banks.116 
However, Pottinger has cautioned that it is highly 
unlikely that domestic financing sources will be 
sufficient to fund all of Australia’s infrastructure 
requirements looking forward. Specifically, Pottinger 
has warned that “from a debt financing perspective, 
the total quantum of debt financing that may be 
required would put significant strain on Australia’s 
big four banks, which are already significantly 
dependent on overseas financing for a significant 
fraction of their overall funding”.117 
A number of industry and government submissions 
to the Productivity Commission’s review of public 
infrastructure also highlighted the recent high-
profile failures of several PPP toll road projects as 
a substantial disincentive for investors to engage 
with new transport projects.118 119 120 121 122 Toll 
network operator Transurban has argued that while 
private sector appetite to take on new transport 
projects with significant patronage risk does exist, 
it is becoming increasingly concentrated amongst 
private investors with a longer investment horizon, 
most notably superannuation funds.123  
The evidence presented to the Productivity 
Commission’s review of public infrastructure would 
appear to suggest that the solution to the decline in 
potential appetite for greenfield transport projects 
lies in a greater involvement by superannuation 
funds in the financing of transport infrastructure. 
Understanding the decline 
in appetite for greenfield 
transport projects
Since the onset of the GFC, governments have faced greater difficulty 
securing private sector finance for greenfield transport projects. The 
Productivity Commission’s report into public infrastructure outlined how 
during the GFC a range of factors decreased the availability of bond finance, 
including the repricing of risk and the demise of monoline insurers.112 
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For Category C projects that require a continuing degree of government 
support, either through availability payments or subsidies per user charge, 
greater competition should reduce the quantum of that support, helping to 
shrink the overall funding gap between service revenue and operational costs. 
Superannuation funds have indicated a keen interest in expanding their 
infrastructure holdings. Ironically, the ageing of Australia’s population might be 
driving a new wave of interest in transport infrastructure as superannuation 
funds attempt to better match an increasing demand for annuity products 
with new holdings of stable, income generating assets. In its submission to 
the Productivity Commission’s inquiry into public infrastructure, Westpac 
explained: 
“Over the next 10 years or so, baby boomers will move into retirement 
phase and there should be greater demand for annuity style returns 
in superannuation. The infrastructure sector is ideally placed to deliver 
that as the long dated nature of these assets aligns with the long dated 
nature of super funds’ liabilities.” 
Evidence submitted by the National Australia Bank (NAB) would appear to 
support this view, though the NAB noted that the current investing framework 
was not providing strong incentives for super funds to restructure their asset 
holdings to include more infrastructure assets. Specifically, NAB noted that: 
“Impediments to debt investment include relatively uncertain yields, 
large and undefined infrastructure assets in the PPP pipeline, and 
regulations that require superannuation funds to be liquid in order to 
meet member switching and redemption demands”
This report takes notes that the vast majority of superannuation investment 
into transport infrastructure has gone towards existing brownfields assets, 
rather than new greenfield transport projects. Making it more attractive for 
superannuation funds to invest in greenfield assets will increase competition 
during project tenders and help reduce the lifetime costs associated with 
delivering new transport infrastructure.
Superannuation 
investment in 
greenfield projects
Increasing the number of investors that are willing to engage with  
greenfield transport projects will strengthen competition during tender 
processes, delivering better outcomes for the government and taxpayers.  
This in turn should reduce the overall cost to government of building  
and operating transport projects. 
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In their submissions to the Productivity Commission 
inquiry into Public Infrastructure, Industry Super 
Australia124 and superannuation fund CBUS125 
argued that the high costs of procuring finance 
was now acting as a significant barrier to the 
involvement of longer-term equity providers in 
greenfield transport projects. 
Industry Super Australia explained:126
“Long-term equity investors like 
superannuation funds do not see the 
relative value to divert resources away 
from pursuing brownfield infrastructure to 
greenfield PPP projects that involve such 
a costly, lengthy and uncertain processes. 
Their long term investment horizon and 
their appetite for illiquid assets make them 
ideal partners for such projects, however, 
the current process is biased towards short 
term financiers and contractors and requires 
reform to level the playing field”
To address this issue, Industry Super Australia has 
proposed an inverted bid model for equity-raising 
based on bidding the equity rate of return for a 
project. Under the proposed “inverted bid model”, 
the traditional bidding process is reversed by 
securing project financing through an equity funding 
competition prior to the construction and operation 
and maintenance (O&M) tenders. 
The inverted bid model unbundles the current 
consortium structure and, having selected an equity 
provider, replaces it with a sequence of tenders for 
the various roles within the project. 
The intention is to give long-term equity investors – 
including superannuation funds –  enhanced buying 
power, potentially lead to some contracts being 
more competitively priced. 
By separating the financing from the construction 
and O&M tenders, the IB Model will increase the 
pool of investors and contractors available to the 
preferred owner-operator. This increased liquidity 
would then lead to more competitively priced fees 
and margins, further helping to reduce the cost of 
new transport projects. 
Whilst not directly related to the funding challenges 
associated with Category C transport infrastructure, 
this report feels that the Inverted Bid Model is 
worthy of further consideration in that it has the 
potential to indirectly reduce the funding gap 
between operational costs and service revenue. 
By separating out O&M tenders, it is plausible that 
operating costs could be contained through a more 
competitive tendering process. More broadly, by 
increasing the number of investors willing to consider 
a greenfield transport investment, governments will 
be better placed to secure more favourable terms 
on the recurrent cost of availability payments and 
other similar items. If both the operating costs of the 
project and the required government contribution are 
reduced, the funding shortfall on tendered Category 
C assets will be substantially improved. 
In considering the Inverted Bid Model, The 
Productivity Commission accepted that the 
requirement to provide fully financed bids remains a 
material impediment to the supply of some sources 
of finance, particular for greenfield transport 
projects. The Commission also agreed that the 
finance costs could be improved by unbundling 
finance from the initial bidding process. 
The Inverted Bid Model
A recent proposal seeks to enhance the capacity of superannuation 
funds to directly invest in greenfield transport projects: Industry Super 
Australia’s (ISA’s) Inverted Bid Model of project financing. 
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In recognition of these factors, the Commission 
has given tentative support to trailing a new hybrid 
model based on Industry Super Australia’s Inverted 
Bid Model. Two critical elements of the hybrid 
model that absolutely must be maintained are:
 The conduct of robust, comprehensive and 
transparent cost-benefit analysis of the 
project that is then made available to all 
potential bidders. The Commission argued 
that publishing this analysis – as well as the 
data and assumptions underpinning it – would 
help reduce bidding costs and potentially 
open the tender process to a broader range of 
participants; 
 A key selection criteria for winning bids based 
on the lowest expected internal rate of return on 
unlevered equity, which is then used to lock in 
the revenue arrangements (including tolls and/or 
availability payments) over the life of the project. 
The Productivity Commission argued that this 
would help ensure that the providers bear 
the risks allocated to them over the life of the 
project. By ensuring an appropriate allocation 
of risk is negotiated through a more competitive 
tender process, any negotiation over tolls and/
or availability payments is likely to result in 
more favourable results for the government and 
taxpayers; and   
By maintaining these two features, competition 
will be enhanced, bidding costs will be lower, and 
negotiations over tolls and/or availability payments 
will be more favourable on the government budget. 
This should help to reduce the cost to government 
of meeting the shortfall between service revenue 
and operational expenditure on Category C 
transport projects that are delivered in conjunction 
with the private sector. 
Given the existing limitations on domestic 
financing, the underdeveloped nature of Australia’s 
corporate bond market, and the existing hesitance 
of investors to engage with greenfield transport 
projects, this report contends that the Productivity 
Commission’s hybrid model – based on ISA’s 
Inverted Bid Model – is both timely and worthy of 
serious consideration.
Despite the strong merits of the above proposals, it 
must be acknowledged that enhanced competition 
and reduced government contributions are still 
unlikely to fully offset the need for recurrent 
subsidies in most Category C transport projects.  
For this reason, this report strongly recommends 
that the proposed mechanism to improve 
infrastructure financing be implemented in 
conjunction with those reforms that are designed 
to address infrastructure funding. Even a highly 
favourable financing framework is unlikely to deliver 
new Category C infrastructure while the issue of 
recurrent funding remains unresolved. 
In order to deliver new transport projects, it is 
inevitable that government will need to either 
find new forms of revenue to fund the recurrent 
subsidies required; or they will need to prepare the 
community for higher levels of user charging on 
new and existing transport infrastructure.
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This report contends that any new initiative to 
raise additional revenue will likely require stronger 
mechanisms to regain the trust of the public. 
One of the greatest challenges confronting the 
NSW Government’s infrastructure strategy is the 
loss of community confidence in the capacity of 
Government to deliver new projects. A litany of 
failed transport plans have over the years eroded 
the community’s belief that they will ever receive an 
integrated transport system. 
This has been exacerbated by the tendency 
for major state infrastructure projects to be 
abandoned, delayed or adjusted with each changes 
of government at both the federal and state level.  
The Parramatta-Epping Line is a case in point. The 
Commonwealth and NSW Governments couldn’t 
agree on which transport projects to prioritise, 
so while funding was allocated within the federal 
government’s budget, the project was never 
delivered. It did not survive the electoral cycle. The 
proposal to build a metro network in Sydney also 
falls in this category. As was outlined in the Action 
for Transport 2010 case study, there have been 
numerous such failings over the last few decades. 
Given the history of under delivery in NSW, the 
community is likely to be reluctant to pay more for 
infrastructure and services that fails to materialise.
Spending on public transport is a notorious political 
football and inherently difficult to sell. Planning, 
financing and building a new rail line can take 
several years and sometimes even a decade before 
the project is fully operational. The 4-year electoral 
cycle is often too short to implement holistic long-
term strategies. Making the case for a government 
to fund and build a new transport network which 
will be opened by another government in a 
generation’s time is politically difficult. The frequent 
result is that only short term projects are able to 
get political, and therefore financial, support. Much 
of the growth in new public transport over the 
past decade has been in light rail, buses and bus 
transit ways, because they can be provided within 
one parliamentary term. Funding only short term, 
politically motivated projects further undermines 
public confidence in government.
The Inner West Light Rail Extension between 
Dulwich Hill and Lilyfield provides an obvious 
example of this phenomenon. The project requires 
a relatively low cost investment of $176 million 
and is able to be delivered over a relatively short 
timeframe of just 3 years from approval, primarily 
because the route runs along a disused goods 
line.127 However, this is also a project that increases 
public transport options in an area which already 
has some of the best public transport in Sydney, 
both in terms of trains and buses. From a needs 
perspective, it is hard to accept that this transport 
project should be a priority while other regions of 
Sydney remain heavily underserviced by public 
transport. 
A new governance 
model and longer  
term politics
Increasing revenue can be politically challenging. Ratepayers are 
unlikely to accept having to contribute additional funds for transport 
infrastructure if they believe that their money isn’t being spent wisely  
or appropriately. 
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In 2008, the Commonwealth Government 
attempted to address the loss of community 
confidence in infrastructure delivery by establishing 
Infrastructure Australia - an independent body at 
arm’s length from the political parties. Infrastructure 
Australia’s task is to advise the Government of the 
day on what projects to fund and in what order. 
More recently, NSW has attempted to replicate this 
model at the state level through the establishment 
of Infrastructure NSW. 
To date both of these organisations have failed 
to fully restore the community’s confidence that 
infrastructure priorities are being determined 
independent of political considerations. 
Infrastructure NSW’s first report was explicitly 
directed to exclude any discussion of the single 
largest item of public transport expenditure in 
the State: the North West Rail Link.128 While both 
these advisory bodies represent a step in the right 
direction, the key decisions on what gets funded 
and when are still being made elsewhere.  Both 
organisations stand outside the main infrastructure 
delivery agencies as mere ‘advisors’.
This need not be the case and isn’t the case 
internationally. Public transport in London is now 
coordinated by Transport for London, an integrated 
body responsible for London’s transport system. 
It answers to a board appointed by the Mayor of 
London. It holds and spends money raised through 
fare box revenues and the London Congestion Tax. 
While it does still report to its civic leaders, it is also 
empowered to improve, operate and expand public 
transport options for Londoners.129
Despite being only a little over a decade old, it 
can already point to considerable improvements 
including an expanding network and growing 
patronage. Transport for London recently secured 
a six year, long term funding package to finance 
and expand the network to 2020.130 Such long term 
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financial commitments are uncommon in NSW. 
Sydney needs a similar agency to coordinate the 
long-term delivery of new public transport. This 
could be as simple as expanding the powers of 
Infrastructure NSW. If we are going to build a city 
wide, integrated transport system we need an 
agency which can take the long term planning for 
infrastructure out of the short term electoral cycle. It 
must be an agency which can be trusted to collect 
and spend hypothecated taxes and charges on the 
services and infrastructure they are empowered to 
deliver – both capital and recurrent. 
In addition to this, NSW will also need to develop 
a political framework that is consistent with long 
term planning and implementation. This could 
be achieved by making the proposed agency 
accountable to Parliament and not just the 
government of the day. The agency would seek 
multi-party political support and input – as well as 
input from transport experts, industry participants 
and community members – in developing holistic, 
long-term infrastructure plans for NSW. In addition, 
a new convention could be set in which strong 
parliamentary approval should be secured for 
major infrastructure investments above a certain 
threshold. 
Under this proposal, any major transport project 
recommended by the authority would first be put 
to the parliament for a vote of support. The vote 
would be in the form of a motion to support an 
individual project or series of projects. Though 
the motion itself could not be binding on the 
government of the day, the practice of initially 
putting each recommendation from the authority 
to a double-chamber vote would provide a good 
opportunity to test overall parliamentary support for 
any individual project or series of projects. 
Many of the recommendations put forward by the 
Authority will be palatable to both political parties, 
though some might receive mixed support. This 
paper calls for a new parliamentary convention 
to be set between all parliamentary forces under 
MCKELL INSTITUTE  |  Getting us there 
FUNDING THE TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE OF TOMORROW 69
which a minimum of two thirds of MPs from 
both houses must vote in support of a project in 
order for it to receive funding. Though not strictly 
enforceable, if both parties were to agree to such a 
convention, infrastructure projects with longer time 
frames would be substantially more likely to receive 
funding. 
Such a convention would mean that both political 
parties effectively share in the benefits and risks of 
transport investment decisions. If a major transport 
project were to blow out in costs due to unforeseen 
circumstances, the opposition of the day would be 
unable to blame it on the government given that 
they too had signed up to the project. Conversely, 
if a larger project is delivered over multiple terms 
of parliament, any change in government would 
not therefore mean that the new governing party 
is able to claim unilateral support for the opening 
of a project initiated by the former governing 
party. Once the convention has been accepted 
by all parliamentary forces, it would also become 
increasingly difficult for any political party to breach 
this convention without also having to pay a 
substantial political cost. 
The rationale for this approach is clear. If a 
government is to make a decision which will impact 
the State’s finances well beyond its parliamentary 
term, then it makes sense that the government 
follow a process which seeks political consensus 
across political forces in Parliament.  
Implementing this idea would require a Premier 
with enough leadership stature to consult and 
involve with a range of political parties as part of 
the new decision making process. It would require 
a government willing to seek wide parliamentary 
support before appointing officers responsible for 
the infrastructure body. 
This process should be used to build public 
confidence in the ability of our political system to 
deliver long term improvements to infrastructure 
and the services which will flow from those 
infrastructure investments.
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Australia is one of the wealthiest societies in the world and Sydney 
is a global city with the capacity to build just about anything. What 
the community needs now is to decide what standard of transport 
infrastructure it expects to receive and to start a discussion about 
how to pay for it.
This report has set out to examine what is currently going wrong 
with the provision of transport infrastructure in NSW. It has set out 
to examine the root causes of the transport infrastructure shortfall 
and has examined a range of possible solutions to addressing that 
shortfall. The problems identified in this report may take decades 
to correct, yet the task of building a fully integrated transport 
network must begin now.
The solutions this report has put forward are not cheap. Individuals 
and businesses will need to pay more through higher taxes and 
charges. The community will also need to embrace a higher denser 
city if it is to overcome the existing inequalities and unfairness of 
the current distribution of transport services. 
This will only be possible if NSW is able to develop political 
processes that will enable the public to regain its trust in 
government to make the tough decisions necessary to securing 
the future of the state transport services.
Most importantly, NSW has to build new institutions which can 
drive and channel money and resources into the intergenerational 
task of delivering a comprehensive, integrated transport network. 
To achieve this will require political maturity across the political 
spectrum. 
We would never have allowed this situation to prevail in health or 
education. We would never accept a system that saw so many of 
our fellow Australians go without access to decent healthcare or 
education. We shouldn’t allow it in transport.
NSW residents will inevitably need to accept the uncomfortable truth that 
there are no more easy solutions with regards to funding and financing the 
infrastructure of tomorrow.  
A new narrative
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